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Introduction

The employment shift from occupations in the middle of the skill distribution toward those
in the tails is one of the most important trends in the U.S. labor market over the last 30
years. Previous research makes the compelling case that a primary driver of this job polarization is routine-biased technological change (RBTC), whereby new machine technologies
and overseas labor substitute for middle-skill jobs in the U.S. and are in turn complementary
to high-skill cognitive jobs.

1

Until recently, RBTC had been thought to be a gradual, secular

phenomenon. However, a long theoretical literature beginning with Schumpeter's creative
destruction (1939) suggests adjustments to technological change may be more episodic. In
boom times, high opportunity costs, or frictions such as adjustment costs, may inhibit resources from being reallocated optimally in the face of technological change. Recessions lower
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the opportunity cost and can produce large enough shocks to overcome these frictions.

Whether adjustments to new technology are smooth or lumpy is important for policy
and for our understanding of recoveries. The recoveries from the last three U.S. recessions
(1991, 2001, 200709) have been jobless: employment was slow to rebound following the
recession despite recovery in aggregate output.

The reasons for jobless recovery are not

well understood, but a small theoretical literature points to adjustment costs as a potential
mechanism, since they generate reallocation that is concentrated in downturns (Berger 2012,
Koenders and Rogerson 2005, Jaimovich and Siu 2012). Such lumpy adjustment may leave a
mass of displaced workers with the wrong skills for new production. Jaimovich and Siu (2015)
provide suggestive evidence that countercyclical reallocation, in the form of RBTC, and
jobless recovery are linked. They show that the vast majority of the declines in middle-skill
employment have occurred during recessions and that, over the same time period, recovery
was jobless only in these occupations.

However, there is no direct evidence on how rms

restructure in the face of technological change, and whether it is gradual or episodic. This
paper aims to ll that gap.
In this paper we investigate how the demand for skills changes over the business cycle. We
use a new data set collected by Burning Glass Technologies that contains the near-universe
of electronically posted job vacancies in 2007 and 20102015. Exploiting spatial variation in
economic conditions, we establish a new fact: the skill requirements of job ads increase in
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that suered larger employment shocks in the Great
Recession, relative to the same areas before the shock and other areas that experienced
smaller shocks.

Our estimates imply that ads posted in a hard-hit metro area are about

5 percentage points (16%) more likely to contain education and experience requirements

1 See for example the seminal work of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003); Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006,
2008); Goos and Manning (2007); and Autor and Dorn (2013).

2 Many theoretical papers predict this phenomenon. See for example Hall (1991, 2005); Mortensen and

Pissarides (1994); Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996); Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001); and Koenders and Rogerson (2005).
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and about 3 percentage points (8-12%) more likely to state requirements for cognitive and
computer skills.

Drawing on the richness of our data, we show that the majority of this

upskilling is driven by increases in skill requirements within occupations, rather than a shift
in the distribution of ads posted. We also show a similar upskilling eect in employment,
using American Community Survey (ACS) data, suggesting that rms successfully hire the
more-skilled workers that they seek.
We then examine whether upskilling is driven by changes to production in a manner
consistent with RBTC. In short, are rms changing what they do or simply changing whom
they hire? Firms may make productivity enhancing improvements in a recession because of
a decline in the opportunity cost of restructuring (Hall 2005), a shift in managerial attention
from growth to eciency (Koenders and Rogerson 2005), or changes in the costs and benets
of making layos (Berger 2012, Jaimovich and Siu 2012). In addition, recessions may drive
Schumpeterian cleansing whereby, older, less-productive rms die, making way for newer,
more-productive rms. In contrast, upskilling may instead occur because rms temporarily
and opportunistically take advantage of a slack market to try to attract workers typically
found higher up on the job ladder, with no accompanying changes to production. As our data
are best-suited to measure a shift in demand from middle- to high-skilled workers, rather
than concomitant demand increases for low-skilled labor that also could be expected from
RBTC, we concentrate our evidence on this margin. We present several analyses supporting
the notion that accelerated RBTC brought on by the Great Recession drives upskilling.
First, we show that upskilling persists at nearly the same magnitude from early in the
recovery through 2015. Even though most measures of local labor market conditions have
converged back to their pre-recession levels by the end of our sample period, elevated skill
requirementsespecially higher in the occupational skill distribution where our data are
most comprehensivehave not. Any purely cyclical explanation is thus insucient. Second,
we show that upskilling is concentrated in non-traded sectors that should be most sensitive
to uctuations in local consumer demand. Third, we show that upskilling is driven both by
continuing rms and by new rms that did not post in 2007, consistent with both Schumpeterian cleansing and changes in adjustment costs within rms. Fourth, we show that within
continuing rms, upskilling eects are not only persistent, but, among publicly traded rms
in our data, those with larger increases in skill requirements also had larger increases in capital stock over the same time period, consistent with a substitution of routine-task workers
with machines. Finally, we rule out that our eects are driven by changes in labor supply
due to unemployment, worker quits, or formal schooling decisions that would lead rms to
opportunistically hire up.
Taken together, our results suggest that rms located in areas hit harder by the Great
Recession were induced to restructure their production toward greater use of machines (or
outsourced labor) and higher-skilled workers; that is, the Great Recession hastened the
polarization of the U.S. labor market.

3

This paper is related to a number of important literatures.

First, we provide direct

evidence that recessions accelerate rm-level responses to technological change.

This is

consistent with the important, but suggestive, evidence provided by Jaimovich and Siu (2015)
that 88% of the job loss in routine-task occupations since the mid-1980s has occurred around
the time of an NBER-dated recession.

The direct, demand-side evidence provided in our

paper speaks to the many models in macroeconomics that assume adjustment costs and
predict that recessions will be times of cleansing (Schumpeter 1939, Koenders and Rogerson
2005, and Berger 2012). These models are important for explaining business cycle dynamics,
but have so far lacked strong empirical evidence.
Second, the Burning Glass job postings data provide a unique opportunity to measure
changes in skill requirements both across and

within

occupations. In contrast, the extant

literature on job polarization has focused on shifts across occupations and has therefore been
unable to ascertain the importance of the intra-occupational margin. We nd that, in MSAs
that experienced worse employment shocks in the Great Recession, demand for education,
experience, and cognitive and computer skills increase within several dierent occupation
groups, and throughout the skill distribution. We therefore present the rst evidence, to our
knowledge, that RBTC occurs within occupations in addition to the well-known adjustments
across occupations.
This result helps to clarify work by Beaudry, Green, and Sand (2014 and 2016) and
others documenting the great reversal in demand for cognitive skill. They show that since
2000, cognitive occupations have seen no gains in employment or wages, and that college
graduates have become more likely to work in routine occupations than previously. They
argue that a decrease in demand for cognitive occupations drove college graduates to take
jobs lower in the occupational distribution, squeezing out the high school graduates who
formerly held them. This is something of a puzzle, especially given the common belief that
technological change continues and the fact that more-skilled workers still earn a sizable
premium in the labor market (Card, Heining, and Kline 2013; Card, Cardoso, and Kline,
forthcoming). Because we nd that upskilling occurs within these occupations as well, we
hypothesize part of the solution to this puzzle is that cognitive workers are being drawn into
(formerly) routine-task occupations as the skill content of these occupations evolves. These
changes make the occupations more-skilled and therefore likely more desirable than before,
although probably still not as desirable as traditional high-skilled jobs.

3

Third, we contribute to a growing literature exploiting data on vacancy postings.

Al-

though several studies have used aggregate vacancy data, and even vacancy microdata, from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Job Openings and Labor Market Turnover (JOLTS) survey
(see, for example, Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger 2012), these data contain little infor-

3 Our analyses, however, do not explain why employment and wages have not grown in high-skill occupations. Deming (2015) proposes a compelling hypothesis that a rising importance of social skills, especially
in conjunction with cognitive skills, can help account for this fact.

4

mation on the characteristics of a given vacancy or the rm that is posting it. Fewer studies
have used vacancy data that contain information on the occupation or specic requirements
of the job posted, and these have generally used narrow slices of the data (Rothwell 2014), or
data that are limited to one vacancy source (Kuhn and Shen 2013, Marinescu 2014). To our
knowledge, we are the rst study to use data based on a near-universe of online job postings
that covers every metropolitan area in the United States.
Fourth, we help answer an important question about the consequences of recessions for
workers. It is well known that low-skilled workers suer worse employment and wage consequences in recessions.

4

Evidence from past recessions shows that in downturns workers

are more likely to take worse jobs, relative to their skills.

5

Some of this may result because

workers apply to a broader set of jobs, even those for which they would normally be overqualied, when job-nding rates decline. However, it is also possible that rms actively seek a
more-skilled worker than they could have attracted in a tighter market, the opportunistic
upskilling mentioned above.

6

We nd some evidence consistent with this opportunistic upskilling:

for some low-

skilled occupations, upskilling eects early in the recovery fade by the end of our sample
period.

Moreover, additionally controlling for labor availability in the form of the local

unemployment rate and the college-graduate-specic unemployment rate absorbs a fraction
of our estimated upskilling eects early in the recovery, but not later, and MSAs where college
graduates were particularly hard hit in the recession (and likely are relatively more plentiful
in the job seeking pool) see additional upskilling eects early in the recovery that also fade.
However, the majority of the upskilling eects persist through 2015, several years into the
recovery, and we conclude that cyclical responses to labor market tightness cannot account
for our main results and for upskilling eects across most of the occupation distribution.
Our conclusions contrast with those from a pair of related papers, concurrent with our
analysis, that use a dierent version of our data to examine both relative increases in skill
requirements early in the recovery (Sasser Modestino, Shoag, and Ballance 2016a) and any
subsequent decreases in skill requirements as markets improved (Sasser Modestino, Shoag,
and Ballance 2016b).

These papers argue that upskilling in the immediate aftermath of

the Great Recesssion was driven entirely by rms opportunistically seeking more-skilled
workers in a slack labor market. While our results qualitatively accord with the empirical
ndings of the rst paper, our more thorough analysis represents a substantial and new
contribution. We examine a longer time horizon and provide a range of analyses that yield

7

a richer characterization of upskilling and allow us to disentangle potential mechanisms.

4 See von Wachter and Handwerker (2009); Hoynes, Miller, and Schaller (2012); and Forsythe (2016).
5 Devereux 2003; Kahn 2010; von Wachter, Oreopoulos, and Heisz 2012; Altonji, Kahn, and Speer 2016.
6 There is mounting evidence that rms at the bottom of the job ladder benet from increased retention of
their incumbent workforce in a downturn (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay 2012 and 2013, Kahn and McEntarfer
2015), but little is known about hiring dynamics.

7 First, in examining data through 2015, and nding persistent upskilling throughout, we rule out their

purely cyclical explanation that is based upon data from only early in the recovery.

5

Second, we charac-

Furthermore, we disagree with the analysis and conclusion of the second paper because the

8

results are sensitive to a set of idiosyncratic data choices.

We demonstrate that during the Great Recession rms changed not only whom they
would hire in the recovery, but how they would produce.

Instead of occurring gradually,

with relatively few workers needing to be reallocated at any given time, technological change
was episodic, resulting in a swath of displaced workers whose skills were suddenly rendered
obsolete as rms ratcheted up their requirements. The need to reallocate workers on such a
large scale may help drive jobless recoveries. It also likely plays a role in the well-noted and
marked decline in male employment-to-population ratios over the past 25 years, especially
since these declines have been stair-step around recessions (Mott 2012).

9

The evidence

provided in this paper is thus integral for understanding worker reallocation, and can help
inform policymakers about the optimal mix during a downturn of worker retraining and
subsidizing job search through unemployment insurance.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the data, while
section 3 summarizes our methodology.

Section 4 presents new facts on upskilling as a

function of local labor market conditions and explores heterogeneity in eects by occuption
skill level and sector tradability. Section 5 examines heterogeneity in upskilling within and
between rms. Section 6 provides a discussion of our results, and section 7 concludes.

2

Data

Our data come from a unique source: microdata from 87 million electronic job postings in the
United States that span the Great Recession (between 2007 and 2015). These job postings
were collected and assembled by Burning Glass Technologies, an employment analytics and
labor market information rm.

In this section, we describe the data and our particular

sample construction. We provide a detailed examination of the sample's characteristics and
representativeness in Appendix A.
terize upskilling throughout the occupation distribution and for a wider set of skills, speaking to recent
developments in the demand for cognitive skill. Third, we show that upskilling is concentrated in non-traded
sectors, which is consistent with our argument of episodic restructuring, and dicult to rationalize with their
opportunistic upskilling argument. Fourth, our rm-level analysis helps us identify Schumpeterian cleansing
from other adjustment cost models, and conrms accompanied increases in capital stock.

8 Notably, they overstate the degree of downskilling during the later recovery by not comparing it to

the overall change in skill requirements from 2007. Additionally, they use only a fraction of available data,
excluding roughly 35% of their weighted ads.

Their results are particularly sensitive to this restriction

(based on our own analysis) and their choice to assign equal weight to all counties, regardless of population
or number of ads. Furthermore, the paper's estimates are also sensitive to the use of one unusual year in the
data to demarcate the beginning of the recovery. Section 4 has additional details.

9 Supporting the notion that episodic restructuring drives stair-step declines in male employment, Foote

and Ryan (2015) point out that middle-skill workers, the most vulnerable to RBTC, are most at risk of
leaving the labor force when unemployed.

6

2.1

Burning Glass Overview

Burning Glass Technologies (henceforth BG or Burning Glass) examines some 40,000 online
job boards and company websites to aggregate the job postings, parse and deduplicate them
into a systematic, machine-readable form, and create labor market analytic products. Thanks
to the breadth of this coverage, BG believes the resulting database captures a near-universe
of jobs that were posted online. Through a special agreement, we obtained an extract from
BG, which covers every MSA in the United States in 2007 and from 2010 through 2015.

10

The two key advantages of our data are its breadth and detail. The broad coverage of
the database presents a substantial strength over data sets based on a single vacancy source,
such as CareerBuilder.com.

While the JOLTS asks a nationally representative sample of

employers about vacancies they wish to ll in the near term, it is typically available only
at aggregated levels, and contains relatively little information about the characteristics of
vacancies. In contrast, the BG data contain some 70 possible standardized elds for each
vacancy. We exploit detailed information on occupation, geography, skill requirements, and
rm identiers. The codied skills include stated education and experience requirements, as
well as thousands of specic skills standardized from open text in each job posting.

11

The

data thus allow for analysis of a key, but largely unexplored, margin of rm demand: skill
requirements within occupation.

12

Moreover, they allow for a rm-level analysis, which, as

we show below, is key to disentangling mechanisms for upskilling.
However, the richness of the BG data comes with a few shortcomings.

Notably, the

database covers only vacancies posted on the Internet. Even though vacancies for available
jobs have increasingly appeared online instead of in traditional sources, such as newspapers,
one may worry that the types of jobs posted online are not representative of all openings. In
Appendix A, we provide a detailed description of the industry-occupation mix of vacancies
in BG relative to other sources (JOLTS, the Current Population Survey, and Occupational
Employment Statistics), an analysis of how it has changed over our sample period, and
various validity checks conducted on the data both by us and by other researchers. To briey
summarize, although BG postings are disproportionately concentrated in occupations and
industries that typically require greater skill, the distributions are relatively stable across

10 The database unfortunately lacks postings from 2008 and 2009. Our extract was provided in February
2016. We also have data on jobs posted in Micropolitan Statistical Areas, which we do not use for lack of
some of the labor market indicators in these areas, and substantial noise in the ones that are available. They
represent 5.6% of all posted ads.

11 For example, an ad might ask for a worker who is bilingual or who can organize and manage a team.

BG cleans and codes these and other skills into a taxonomy of thousands of unique, but standardized
requirements. Beginning with a set of pre-dened possible skills, BG searches text in an ad for an indication
that the skill is required. For example, for team work, they search for the key words team work but also
look for variations such as ability to work as a team.

12 Other private-sector rms, such as Wanted Analytics, used by the Conference Board's Help-Wanted

Online Index, also oer disaggregated data, but not skill requirements. State vacancy surveys, conducted
by a limited number of states, sometimes collect certain skill requirements, but cover only a few geographic
areas and are generally not comparable across states.
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time, and the aggregate and industry trends in the quantity of vacancies track other sources

13

reasonably closely.

The data contain the occupation of the posting (at the 6-digit Standard Occupation
Classication 2010 (SOC) level) and codes identifying the MSA where it is located. Burning
Glass also collects the rm name, if available, for a given posting. Employer name is missing
in 40% of postings, primarily from those listed on recruiting websites that typically do not
list the employer.

14

We restrict our main sample to ads with non-missing employers that posted at least
10 ads over the sample period of 2007 and 2010-2015.

15

130,440 distinct employers.

After cleaning, our data contain

Many of our analyses exploit rm-level information to distin-

guish among possible mechanisms for upskilling.

We therefore choose to focus our entire

analysis on the consistent sample of ads with non-missing rms, with a sucient number
of observations per rm to estimate rm-level characteristics. However, we have performed
analyses not requiring rm-level information on the full data set and obtain very similar
results. Moreover, as we discuss later, we have conrmed that the probability of satisfying
this sample criterion (having a valid rm identier) does not vary over the business cycle.
Thus, our sample restriction should not confound the estimated relationship between local
labor market conditions and the skill requirements of postings.

2.2

Skill Requirements in Burning Glass

In our analyses, we exploit four categories of skill requirements: stated education and experience requirements, stated demand for skills that we classify as cognitive, and stated
demand for computer skills. The RBTC literature emphasizes that new information technology or cheap overseas labor substitute for routine, algorithmic, middle-skill tasks. These
new technologies are in turn complementary with high-skill cognitive, abstract tasks and
may indirectly aect low-skill, manual tasks. However, a downside of the BG sample is that
low-skill jobs are underrepresented. We thus focus our analysis on the former margin, the
degree to which employers shift demand from medium- toward high-skill tasks and workers.
High-skilled workers favored by RBTC may be required to work with computers and perform a more versatile set of functions. Indeed, the non-algorithmic tasks that complement
routine-task performing machines or overseas labor, involve more complexity, problem solving and analytical skills, and the ability to determine which tasks need to be performed at

13 BG deduplicates multiple postings for the same vacancy. It is important to note that although BG's
parsing algorithm has changed over time, each iteration is applied to all postings data, so our data set is
consistent over our sample period.

14 When name is available, Burning Glass uses a proprietary algorithm to group name variants into a

standard set: for example, Bausch and Lomb, Bausch Lomb, and Bausch & Lomb would be grouped
together. We also perform some additional cleaning on rm name, removing any remaining punctuation and
a few problematic words, such as Incorporated (sometimes listed as Inc).

15 The 10-ad restriction drops about 4% of job ads that list a rm name. However, employer names with

very few ads are likely to be miscoded (for example, capturing a fragment of the city name).
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a given moment.
In accord with human capital theory, we believe more-educated workers or those with

16

some amount of experience on the job will be better able to perform these functions.

In

Appendix A.3, to cross-validate the data, we show that education requirements strongly
correlate with average education levels of employed workers at the MSA and occupation
levels.
We categorize cognitive and computer skill requirements based on the open text elds for
skills. We designate an ad as requiring computer skills if it contains the key word computer
or it is categorized as software by BG.

17

We dene cognitive skill requirements based on a set

of key words associated with non-routine analytical tasks, using the taxonomy developed by
Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and subsequently used by the majority of papers studying
RBTC and polarization. We also ensure that the presence of these key words correlates with
external measures of cognitive skill at the occupation level.

18

This set of skills (education, experience, cognitive, and computer) aligns well with our
priors on how jobs change with the availability of computers (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011).
For example, a sales person who previously devoted most of his or her energy to client
relations may now be required to use data analytics to better target packages to clients.
This salesperson now needs computer and analytical skills, and some experience in the eld
may help in mapping data recommendations to practice. Similarly, thanks to machine vision
technology, a quality control operator no longer need spend his or her time measuring and
identifying the shapes of produced goods , but instead can be diverted to other tasks such
as troubleshooting and making judgement calls in design optimization.

This set of tasks

19

requires higher cognitive function and intuition that can be gained by experience.
Table 1 summarizes data for the primary regression sample.

20

In 2007, 34% of the

16 In the raw data, there are two elds each for education and experience requirements: a minimum level
(degree or years of experience) and a preferred level. Postings that do not list an education or experience
requirement have these elds set to missing. We use the elds for the minimum levels to generate variables
for the presence of an education or experience requirement as well as the number of years of education or
experience required; the minimum is much more commonly specied than the preferred, and it is always
available when a preferred level is listed.

17 BG includes common software (e.g., Excel, PowerPoint, AutoCAD), as well as less common software

and languages (e.g., Java, SQL, Python).

18 Specically, an ad is categorized as requesting a cognitive skill if any listed skills include at least one of the

following phrases: research, analysis, decision, or thinking. The fraction of ads at the occupation level
that contain each of these skills is strongly correlated with an O*NET measure developed by Joe Altonji
meant to categorize cognitive occupations.

This check is important.

For example, we nd that presence

of the phrase problem solving, which is often associated wtih non-routine tasks, is uncorrelated with the
O*NET measure, and is instead present at high frequency in all kinds of posts. Deming and Kahn (2016)
also use these measures to study rm heterogeneity in skill demands.

19 It has been suggested by Deming (2015) and others that machines and overseas labor complement workers

with interpersonal skills, since machines are still poor at reading and inferring human emotion. We have
also analyzed changes in demand for a composite social skill requirement and obtained results very similar
to those presented here on cognitive and computer skills.

20 In the top two panels, observations are weighted as they are in our regression analyses: we give equal

weight to ads within an MSA-year, but upweight larger MSAs, based on the size of the labor force in 2006.
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weighted ads list any education requirement (column 1, row 1). Among ads with an education requirement, half (17% of all ads) specify minimum education of a bachelor's degree,
another quarter ask for a high school diploma, and the remainder are roughly evenly split
between associate degrees (not shown), master's degrees, and professional degrees or PhDs.
Converting the degrees to their modal equivalent years of schooling, the average education
requirement, conditional on one being specied, is nearly 15 years.
The second column shows skill requirements averaged over 20102015. The third column
shows the within-MSA change in skill requirements across the two sample periods, and indicates statistical signicance. The share of ads specifying an education requirement increased
by 23 percentage points (ppts), on average. This is roughly evenly split across ads requiring
high school and ads requiring college; because the proportional increase is slightly larger for
high school, the overall (conditional) years of schooling falls slightly. All dierences in means
are statistically signicant at the 1% level.
Experience requirements follow a very similar pattern to education requirements. In 2007,
almost one-third of ads specify some amount of experience in the eld. Among ads with a
requirement, the vast majority ask for less than ve years, with much of the remainder
asking for between ve and 10 years.
the average ad asks for 3.5 years.

Conditional on posting an experience requirement,

In the later time period, the propensity to specify an

experience requirement increases by 20 ppts. These increases are again concentrated in the
lower categories so that the average, conditional on specifying any requirement, falls by about
one-fth of a year.
Finally, in 2007, 73% of weighted ads specify at least one specic, text-based skill requirement.

Among these, more than one-sixth specify a cognitive skill requirement, and

more than one-quarter have a computer requirement. In 20102015, 91% of ads have at least
one text-based skill requirement, and the shares specifying cognitive skills or computer skills
increase to roughly one-quarter and two-fths, respectively. In regression analyses, we use
the probability of posting a cognitive or computer skill requirement,

conditional

on posting a

specic text-based skill, as dependent variables, rather than the unconditional probabilities,
which might instead pick up a tendency for ads to become more verbose as postings costs
decline.
These increases in stated skill demand could be driven by the national recession that took
place between 2007 and the 20102015 period, which would be consistent with our hypothesis.
However, they could also be driven by a variety of other factors, such as changing composition
of rms posting ads online or pre-existing national trends. Because of these issues and the
relatively short panel we have to work with, our regression analyses always control for year
dummies. We therefore fully absorb the overall change in skill requirements illustrated in
table 1.

Instead, we identify dierences in the change in skill requirements across metro

areas as a function of how they weathered the Great Recession.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics

mean (sd) in:
2007
2010-15

Change

Education Requirements:
Any
HS
BA
>BA
Years, Conditional on any

0.34
(0.06)
0.09
(0.03)
0.17
(0.05)
0.03
(0.01)
14.84
(0.40)

0.57
(0.05)
0.20
(0.05)
0.27
(0.08)
0.05
(0.01)
14.66
(0.44)

0.32
(0.06)
0.13
(0.03)
0.14
(0.03)
0.05
(0.02)
3.52
(0.47)

0.52
(0.07)
0.24
(0.03)
0.21
(0.04)
0.08
(0.04)
3.34
(0.54)

0.73
(0.05)
0.17
(0.05)
0.27
(0.06)

0.91
(0.04)
0.23
(0.06)
0.39
(0.08)

0.23***
0.10***
0.10***
0.02***
-0.18***

Experience Requirements:
Any
0-3
3-5
>5
Years, Conditional on any

0.20***
0.11***
0.07***
0.03***
-0.18***

Skill Requirements:
Any Stated Skills
Cognitive, conditional on any
Computer, conditional on any
share of ads in 2010-2015:
Missing ACS match
Continuing firm-MSA
In Compustat, among continuing
# MSAs
Posts per MSA-year
# Occupations (4-digit)
Posts per occupation-MSA-year
# Firms
Posts per Firm-MSA-year

0.08
0.54
0.47
Mean
381
21,507
108
225
130,440
14

0.18***
0.07***
0.11***

Min

Max

132

1,198,662

1

189,642

1

16,413

Notes: Burning Glass data 2007 and 2010-2015. Sample is restricted to ads with nonmissing firms that posted at least 10 ads over our sample period. In the top, observations are
weighted by the size of the MSA labor force in 2006. Missing ACS match is the share of
observations to MSAs that cannot be matched to the American Community Survey (weighted
by the MSA labor force). Continuing firm-MSAs are firm-MSAs that post in 2007 and 20102015 and In Compustat among continuing are the sharing of continuing firm-MSAs that can
be matched to compustat. Both statistics are calculated weighting by the firm's ad share in
the MSA-year times the size of the MSA labor force in 2006. *** indicates means are
statistically significantly different from each other at the 1% level.
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3

Methodology

We estimate regressions of the form specied in equation (1), where

skill

is any of several

measures of the average skill requirements (discussed in more detail below) in MSA
year

t (2010 ≤ t ≤ 2015), shockm

the Great Recession,

I

t

m,

and

is a measure of the local employment shock generated by

are year dummies,

Xm

is a vector of MSA controls, and

εmt

is an

error term.

skillmt − skillm07 = α0 + [shock m ∗ I t ]α1 + I t + Xm β + εmt .

(1)

The regression thus estimates the impact of the local employment shock generated by the
Great Recession on the

change

in skill requirements for a given MSA between 2007 and each

year of 2010 through 2015. Such a specication allows us to empirically investigate the timing
and persistence of upskilling in relation to local labor market shocks. It also accords with
several macroeconomic models that predict that productivity-enhancing improvements will
be more likely to take place in recessions. In the classic Schumpeter (1939) cleansing model,
this would occur because low-productivity rms shut down in the recession and resources
are reallocated to new rms with more modern production.

21

In addition, several classes

of models can rationalize episodic restructuring within surviving rms as well. A negative
product demand shock lowers the opportunity cost of adjusting production (Hall 2005), may
shift managerial attention from growth to eciency (Koender and Rogerson 2005), changes
the costs and benets of making layos (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, Berger 2012),

22

and

alters incentives to invest in human capital (Jaimovich and Siu 2012).
The key explanatory variable,

shockm , is the MSA-specic change in projected year-over-

year employment growth from 2006 to 2009, the national peak and trough years surrounding
the Great Recession. We project employment growth in an MSA based on its employment
shares in 3-digit NAICS industry codes in 2004 and 2005 and national employment changes
at the 3-digit industry level.

This type of shift-share method is sometimes referred to as

23

a Bartik shock, following the strategy of Bartik (1991).

We use the Bartik measure,

21 See also Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
22 Though not formalized, a suciently large negative product demand shock could make layos worthwhile,
osetting any stigma or losses in terms of rm-specic human capital.

23 Specically, we dene Bartik employment growth as

digit industries,

φ

is the employment share of industry

of 2004 and 2005),

lnEkt

PK

φm,k,τ (lnEkt − lnEk,t−12 ), where for K 3m at time τ (in practice, the average
in industry k in year-month t, and lnEkt−12

k=1

k

in MSA

is the log of national employment

is the log of national employment in industry in the same calendar month one year prior (both seasonally
adjusted).
tics.

We obtain national employment for each 3-digit industry from Current Employment Statis-

We construct

φ

using County Business Patterns data and the algorithm of Isserman and West-

ervelt (2006) to overcome data suppressions; the resulting county-level statistics are mapped to MSAs
using the denitions provided by the Census Bureau and set by the Oce of Management and Budget.
See http://www.census.gov/population/metro/data/def.html. Other papers utilizing Bartik shocks include
Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Notowidigdo (2013).

The measure may be used directly as a regressor

(reduced-form) or as an instrument for observed employment growth; in practice, this choice often does not
matter much, and that is also true in our case.
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instead of actual employment growth (as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics), for
two reasons. First, actual employment growth at the MSA level is measured with substantial
error, while the Bartik measure allows for more precision. Second, actual employment growth
will reect shocks to labor demand as well as other city-specic shocks, including those to

24

labor supply, which may be problematic.

We note that other direct measures of local

labor market tightness, such as the local unemployment rate, have similar shortcomings in
terms of measurement error or reverse causality; for instance, an unemployment rate may be
high precisely

because

a sudden demand shift toward more-skilled labor generates structural

25

mismatch.

The variable

shockm

is xed at the MSA-level for our entire sample period, and we

examine its impact on the change in skill conditions for each year 20102015 through an

t
exhaustive set of year interactions. Since we control for year xed eects (I ), we identify
the key coecients,

α1 ,

purely o of dierences across metro areas in the employment shock

generated by the Great Recession, rather than relying on the national shock itself.

As

noted above, this is a necessity given our short panel. We would have diculty separately
identifying coincident national trends, such as changes in the use of online job boards. The
calculated values of

shockm

range from about

=0.12 to =0.04 across MSAs, but to make

the coecients easier to interpret, we renormalize this variable so that a one unit change is
equal to the dierence between the 10th and 90th percentile MSAs,

=0.026 log points.26

The rst-dierence specication implicitly controls for dierences across MSAs in posted
skill requirements. Although our cross-sectional identication does not identify MSA xed
eects in the

change

in skill requirements, we do control for a wide range of MSA character-

isticsincluding demographics, educational attainment, and economic indicatorsobtained

27

from the American Community Survey (ACS), averaging years 2005 and 2006.

These con-

trols help adjust for dierences across MSAs in their preexisting tendency to upskill, to the
extent that such a tendency is correlated with the skill distribution of the population or the
health of its economy before the Great Recession.
In order to understand changes in skill requirements both within and across rms and
jobs, we disaggregate our data to estimate changes in skill requirements within occupation-

24 For example, MSAs with secular increases in population due to migration ows may experience employment changes that are higher than average but still have a weakening labor market. The Bartik shock
addresses this issue.

25 Nonetheless, our estimates are qualitatively robust to using actual employment growth or the unemploy-

ment rate, although magnitudes are somewhat reduced, likely for the reasons indicated.

26 Note, this normalization also implies that a larger value corresponds to a worse employment shock.
27 We chose years just prior to the Great Recession that allow for MSA identication (prior to 2005, the

ACS lacks substate identiers). Specically, we include the share of the population that is female, black,
Hispanic, Asian, married, migrated in the last year, is a high school drop out, has exactly a high school
diploma, has some college, has exactly a bachelor's degree, is enrolled in school, is less than age 18, is age
1929, is age 3039, is age 4049, and is age 5064. We also control for the employment-to-population ratio
and the average weekly wage of full-time workers. We can match all but 8% of weighted ads to the ACS (see
the middle panel of table 1), with unmatched ads consisting of small MSAs. In such cases, we set the ACS
controls to zero and include an indicator for not matching.
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MSA, sector-MSA, rm-MSA, and rm-occupation-MSA cells. We categorize occupations
based on 4-digit SOC codes.

28

These analyses are described in more detail below.

We cluster standard errors by MSA to address possible serial correlation within an area.

29

Finally, we weight observations in this regression by the size of the MSA labor force in 2006.
This weighting scheme allows us to upweight areas with larger populations, helping with
precision, while xing the weight applied to each MSA-year.

The latter ensures that we

identify o of the same MSA weighting mix in each year, regardless of the overall changes

30

in ads posted.

From the bottom panel of table 1, we estimate these regressions using all 381 MSAs, which
contain an (unweighted) average of 21,507 posts per MSA-year. When we disaggregate to
the four-digit occupation level, we have 108 occupations represented, with an average of
225 posts in each occupation-MSA-year. Finally, as noted above, our data contain 130,000
unique rms, which translate into an average of 14 posts in each rm-MSA-year.

4

Skill Requirements and Local Employment Conditions

4.1

Main Results

Figure 1 summarizes regression results from equation (1) for our four main dependent variables: the change in the share of ads posting any education requirement, any experience
requirement, any cognitive requirement, and any computer requirement.

The gures plot

the estimated impact of the Bartik shock on the change in skill requirements for each year,
relative to 2007 (coecients

α1 ),

as well as 90% condence intervals.

Beginning with the top left panel, we nd that the probability of specifying any education
requirement increases by 5.4 ppts, relative to the average requirement for ads posted in the
same MSA in 2007, for an MSA experiencing a large employment shock (90th percentile),
compared to an MSA experiencing a small shock (10th percentile). This increase is 16% of
the average requirement in 2007 and is signicant at the 1% level.

The eect persists at

fairly similar magnitudes and signicance levels for subsequent years, with a small dip in
2012. In 2015, we estimate that the probability of posting an education requirement is still
4.1 ppts larger than it was in 2007 for a hard-hit MSA, compared to a less hard-hit one.
That is, 76% of the initial upskilling eect in 2010 remains ve years later.

Estimates in

31

each year except 2012 are signicant at the 1% level.

28 We choose the 4-digit occupation aggregation primarily to save on computation time, but also to ensure
larger cell sizes. Results are robust to disaggregating to the 6-digit level.

29 We have also estimated regressions clustering at the MSA-date level, which is the level of variation

underlying

α1 ,

and obtain substantially smaller standard errors.

30 When we disaggregate across occupations, sectors, and/or rms within MSAs, we weight by the product

of the MSA labor force and the ad share of the occupation, sector, rm, or rm-occupation in an MSA-date.
Because of our weighting scheme, the more aggregate regressions produce results identical to those using
more disaggregated data when the underlying specication is the same.

31 As we reported in footnote 8, Sasser-Modestino et al. (2016b) nd evidence of downskilling in education
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Figure 1: Skill Requirements and the MSA-Specic Employment Shock
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Graphs plot coefficients on MSA employment shock interacted with year, and 90% CI's (dashed lines).
Regressions also control for year fixed effects and MSA characteristics.

The remaining panels of gure 1 exhibit remarkably similar patterns in both magnitudes
and statistical signicance. The probability of listing an experience requirement increases
by 5.0 ppts (16%), and 85% of this increase remains in 2015. The probability of listing a
cognitive requirement increases by 2.0 percentage points (12%), and the gap across cities
widens slightly by 2015. Finally, the probability of listing a computer skill requirement also
increased by roughly 2 ppts and remained elevated through 2015.
Appendix gure D1 summarizes results for additional education and experience outcomes
in order to understand changes in the intensive margin for these requirements.

In gure

D1a, there are similar-sized eects for increases in the probability of requiring a high school
diploma and a bachelor's degree. These increases oset each other, resulting in no overall
change in the years of education required, conditional on posting any requirement.
there is no change in the propensity to require a graduate degree.

Also,

In some ways this is

reassuring, since many professional jobs, such as lawyers and professors, always require higher
degrees; these requirements would not change with improvements in technology.

Figure

and experience requirements as local labor market conditions improved between 2010 and 2014. Their use of
a rst-dierence specication examining changes from 2010 to 2012 and from 2012 to 2014 makes their results
quite sensitive to the choice of the intermediate year, and their nding of downskilling comes entirely from
the small downward blip in 2012. This blip is even larger in magnitude in the subset of data they use: they
exclude all but the largest six-digit-occupation-by-county cells (omitting roughly 35% of weighted postings),
and this exclusion is exacerbated by their choice to weight counties equally, regardless of population or
number of postings. The more careful picture generated by using all available data, as captured in gure 1,
provides strong evidence that the vast majority of the increase in skill requirements in locations hit harder
by the Great Recession remains through 2015.
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Figure 2: Labor Market Variables and the MSA-Specic Employment Shock
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Graphs plot coefficients on MSA employment shock interacted with year, and 90% CI's (dashed lines).
Regressions also control for year fixed effects and MSA characteristics.

D1b exhibits a similar pattern for experience requirements.

We see increases in both low

experience requirements (2 years or less) and middle requirements (35 years).

Beyond

that we see little change. Again, this results in little change overall in the distribution of
requirements, conditional on posting any.
For contrast, gure 2 summarizes estimates of equation (1) for a range of local labor

32

market statistics as dependent variables.

The top left panel shows the unemployment rate,

and our estimate implies that a hard-hit MSA (90th-percentile Bartik shock) experiences an
increase in the unemployment rate between 2007 and 2010 that is 2 ppts greater than a less
hard-hit MSA (10th percentile). Over time, the impact of the shock declines in magnitude,
and by 2015, unemployment rate dierentials across MSAs have converged back to their
pre-recession levels. We nd similar convergence in employment levels (top right panel).

33

The bottom left panel shows employment-to-population ratio (epop) estimates, which run
only through 2014 because of data availability. We nd that a hard-hit MSA experiences a
1.25 ppt larger decline in its employment-to-population ratio in 2010, and only about 15% of

32 MSA unemployment rates and employment are obtained from the BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics and Current Employment Statistics programs, respectively. Employment-to-population ratios are based
on the authors' calculations from the ACS. At the time of this writing, ACS data for 2015 had not been
released.

33 That is, we nd that the portion of unemployment rates and employment predicted by Bartik em-

ployment growth converged back to their pre-recession levels by 2015, holding constant pre-recession MSA
characteristics. Actual dierences across cities were somewhat slower to converge.
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this gap had narrowed by 2014.

There could be many reasons for this lack of convergence.

For example, rapid adoption of new technologies in hard-hit MSAs over this time period
could render a swath of worker skills obsolete, inducing labor force exit (also see Foote and
Ryan 2015). This could be especially true among older workers for whom retraining may
not be worthwhile. Alternatively, it could also reect our age controls not fully capturing
retirement eects from aging baby boomers. We thus also provide estimates using the epop
among the prime-aged population (age 2555) in the bottom right panel. Here we see similar
initial eects in 2010 but nd that two-thirds of the gap across cities had converged by 2015.
Clearly, MSA labor markets had not fully recovered from the Great Recession by the
end of 2015. Yet, on most measures, there was substantial progress after 2010, with cities
moving closer to their pre-recession dierences. At the same time, in gure 1 we see almost
no convergence in skill requirements.
Appendix tables D1a and D1b provide some robustness checks to the main skills results
in gure 1, including accounting for the labor market variables just shown and applying
dierent sample restrictions. Results underlying gure 1 are shown in column 1. In column
2, we additionally control for the change in the MSA unemployment rate in each year, relative
to 2007, and the change in the unemployment rate for college graduates. These controls help
address an important alternative hypothesis for the upskilling eects we nd: rms may
become pickier when labor, and especially skilled labor, becomes more plentiful.

35

If our

estimates are driven by opportunistic search behavior on the part of rms, they should load
on the unemployment rate variables that represent time-variation in the availability of skill.
We nd that including these controls does slightly reduce the impact of the Bartik shock
early in the recovery (by about a fth) for education and experience requirements, but that
they have no eect on coecients later in the sample period. This is intuitive and is driven
by the fact that unemployment rates have converged back to their pre-recession levels by the
end of the sample period, while skill requirements have not.
Column 3 of appendix tables D1a and D1b present the baseline results using the full
sample of ads, including those with missing rm names. (As mentioned above, we focus on
the 60% of ads that contain rm name because this sample allows us to later distinguish
among mechanisms for upskilling.) One might be concerned, for example, that ads with rm
names have dierentially changing skill requirements relative to ads without rm identiers,
perhaps due to rm size or prestige.

However, results on the expanded sample are quite

36

similar to those in gure 1 for all dependent variables.

Thus, there is considerable evidence that MSAs with more severe labor demand shocks

34 These ndings are consistent with Yagan (2016) who uses IRS tax data to show that while unemployment
rates had converged aross U.S. commuting zones following the Great Recession, employment probabilities
had not, holding constant a rich set of worker characteristics.

35 Or, as in Menzio and Shi (2011), rms become temporarily pickier in a recession because of the negative

productivity shock.

36 We also nd no systematic relationship between the change in the share of ads with a missing rm and

our key explanatory variables. See column 1 of appendix table D2.
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Figure 3: Relative Employment by Skill and the MSA-Specic Employment Shock
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Based on Census and ACS data from 2000, 2005-2014. Graphs plot coefficients on MSA shock interacted with year, and 90% CI's (dashed lines).
The top three panels show the change in relative employment rates (compared to dropouts) for high school graduates, some college,
and at least a BA, respectively. The bottom right panel shows the change in the average experience level of employed workers.
Regressions also control for a time trend.

during the Great Recession experienced larger and more persistent increases in the skill requirements of their job postings. Of course, stated preferences for skill are not necessarily
reected in realized employment. For example, given the relatively low cost of advertising
electronically and the weak labor markets in 2010 and 2011, rms might post high skill
requirements to gauge the available pool of labor, without necessarily expecting to immediately ll a position. Moreover, since the job postings data are available starting only in 2007,
we cannot observe whether changes in stated skill requirements were simply a continuation
of a previous trend. To address both these issues, we analyze changes in the skill level of
employed workers using Census and ACS data that are available for a wider range of years

37

(2000 and 20052014).

Figure 3 summarizes results for four dependent variables and a similar specication to

38

equation (1).

The rst three panels measure changes in relative employment rates across

education groups.

For example, the top left panel measures the change in the ratio of

high-school-graduate to high-school-dropout employment rates.

This relative employment

rate averages 1.6 across our whole sample period. We nd that in a hard-hit state (90thpercentile shock), the high-school-graduatedropout relative employment rate increases by

37 In these years, 66% of MSAs (roughly 85% of the population) can be identied.
38 We naturally do not include the ACS controls in these regressions since they are highly collinear with
the employment variables on the left hand side in contemporaneous years. Also, we include a time trend,
rather than year xed eects, because we have a smaller set of MSAs to separately identify the national
trends. Results with year xed eects are similar but noisier.
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510 percentage points after 2007, relative to a less hard-hit state (10th-percentile shock).
We nd similar eects for the change in relative employment of workers with some college
compared to dropouts (top right), and the change for workers with at least a bachelor's
degree relative to dropouts (bottom left).
In the bottom right panel, we examine the change in the average experience level of
employed workers. Experience is simply years of school minus age minus six, which is dierent
in spirit from the stated requirement in the BG data that an applicant needs experience in
the eld.

However, more-experienced workers are still more skilled than less-experienced

workers, and the measure is as close as the data allow.

We nd that in hard-hit states,

average experience is about a fth of a year higher than it was in 2007, relative to less
hard-hit states.

39

Finally, we note that data from 2000, 2005, and 2006 show that the skill composition
of employed workers was similar across MSAs and unrelated to how severely the Great
Recession would aect areas. This pattern is reassuring that there are also no pretrends in
stated skill requirements.
We thus present strong evidence that employers in harder-hit MSAs were induced to
increase both stated preferences for a range of skills that are complementary to RBTC and
employment of skilled, relative to unskilled workers.

Futhermore, while most measures of

local labor-market strength had converged back to pre-recession levels by 2015, dierences
in stated and realized skill demands remained. MSAs that experienced severe shocks in the
Great Recession still look dierent from how they appeared in 2007, and dierent from other
cities that experienced weaker shocks.

4.2

Heterogeneity within and across Occupations

Why do skill requirements change dierentially across MSAs?

It is possible that these

dierences result from selection: perhaps in harder-hit MSAs only higher-skilled jobs survive
in the early recovery. An episodic RBTC-based explanation involving changes in production
technology, however, would imply upskilling within occupations, even as demand also shifts
across occupations, from routine to abstract.

For example, community and social service

specialists at a food bank in Washington, D.C. might be required not only to interact with
clients to assist with food security, but may have to understand and use database software
and GIS, as well, to better serve them (McCoy 2016).

Simultaneously, in order to better

reach and understand online readers venerable journalistic organizations such as the

York Times

New

now hire scientists, not reporters, to be chief data ocers (Greeneld 2014).

To investigate whether MSA-level changes in skill requirements are prevalent within
and/or across occupations, we generate counterfactual skill distributions and estimate re-

39 This result is consistent with Forsythe (2016), who nds that the hire rate of young workers falls, relative
to that of older workers, in recessions. She provides evidence based on wage data that these changes in hiring
are driven by labor demand, rather than by labor supply.
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Figure 4: Within and Across Occupation Changes in Skill Requirements
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Blue solid line = within-occ-MSA change, red dashed line = across-occ-MSA change
Graphs plot impact of MSA shock on only change in each element, holding constant
the other element at its 2007 level. Regressions also control for year fixed effects and MSA characteristics.

gressions like equation (1), using as the dependent variable the change in a counterfactual
skill distribution from the actual 2007 MSA-level skill requirement. We plot the coecients
on

shockm ∗ I t

in gure 4. The solid blue line presents results where we hold constant the

occupation distribution of ads within an MSA in 2007 and allow only the within occupationMSA skill requirement to change. The dashed red line, in contrast, holds constant the within
occupation-MSA skill requirement at its 2007 level and allows the occupation distribution
of ads within the MSA to vary with time.
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As can be seen, the entirety of the eect is concentrated on the within-occupation margin, with no role for the shifting distribution of ads across occupations. Skill requirements
increase in hard-hit MSAs because for the same 4-digit occupations, ads are more likely to
list education, experience, cognitive, and computer requirements.
We also examine the robustness of the within-occupation changes in skill requirements
to a range of specications, based on equation (2), which has 4-digit-occupation-MSA-year
cells as the unit of observation.

(2)

skillomt − skillom07 = α0 + [shock m ∗ I t ]α1 + I t + Xm β + εomt .

40 Virtually all ads posted in the 20102015 period are in occupation-MSAs that also posted in 2007, so
we can generate change variables. The 0.36% of ads that cannot be matched back are dropped from these
analyses. Our formal decomposition in section 5.1 addresses this concern. We also address the fact that order
in the decomposition matters (for example, we could have instead benchmarked the non-changing variable
at its time

t level, rather than at 2007).
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The results are reported in appendix tables D1a and D1b. Column 4 summarizes the baseline specication, while column 5 adds occupation xed eects and occupation-specic time
trends.
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These controls allow occupations to systematically dier in their change in skill re-

quirements from 2007, as well as in the slope of the change, across all MSAs. These could be
important if some occupations are both more likely to upskill or accelerate upskilling because
of preexisting trends and are disproportionately located in hard-hit MSAs. The controls also
help adjust for changes in the sample driven, say, by changes in the representativeness of
occupations in the BG data. However, we obtain very similar results even when including
the occupation-specic controls.
Finally, our data aord the unique opportunity to measure changes in skill requirements
within occupations, while the bulk of work on polarization has measured shifts in employment
and wages only across occupations. That literature has successfully pinpointed the kinds of
occupations that can be replaced by machines or overseas labor using information on the
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tasks performed by workers at the occupation level.

These occupations tend to be in the

middle of the skill distribution, since those jobs tend to be the more routine. Autor (2014)
and Jaimovich and Siu (2015) point out that employment shifted away from middle-skill
occupations in the Great Recession.

Though not shown, we also nd this to be true of

vacancy postings. We instead focus on our ability to measure task and skill content of jobs
in the BG data to ask whether RBTC also occurs

within

middle-skill occupations.

To explore heterogeneity in within-occupation changes in skill requirements induced by
the Great Recession, we estimate equation (2) separately for 20 occupation skill groups. As
is common in the literature (Autor 2015), we dene occupation skill by wage percentiles
from a xed point in time. In our case, we use the 2000 Census to divide occupations into
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ventiles, based on their average weekly wage of full-time workers.

41 BG generates occupation codes using an imputation that is based on the job title and other characteristics
of the ad.

One might be worried about the accuracy of this imputation and, though the algorithm was

constant over our sample period, the amount of measurement error induced by the xed algorithm could
vary over time. Reassuringly, the baseline results are nearly identical to the MSA-level results presented in
gure 1.

42 The original work by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) used

the US Department of Labor's

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT; US Department of Labor 1977) to

categorize occupations into manual, routine, and cognitive.

They chose this categorization, arguing that

new technologies can successfully replace American workers performing routine, algorithmic tasks, and are
complementary to both manual and cognitive and analytical functions. Indeed, though coarse, this grouping
successfully predicted employment changes in the 1990s and has been used in a number of subsequent papers,
including Autor and Dorn (2013).

43 We obtain weekly wages (annual wage and salary income divided by weeks worked in the last year) of

full-time, full-year workers (worked at least 48 hours in the last week and usually work at least 35 hours
per week) from the 2000 Census and dene ventiles based on Census sample weights. We do not follow the
traditional approach of using the 1980 wage distribution both because we are interested in a more modern
characterization of skills and because long-term institutional and structural changes in the labor market (e.g.,
the declining share of unions and the growth of information technology) have made the earnings distribution
in 1980 a poorer proxy for skill 30 years later. However, we do obtain qualitatively similar results if we use
the 1980 wage skill distribution, or if we classify occupations based on a measure of critical-thinking and
problem-solving intensity derived from O*Net and developed by Joseph Altonji.
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Figure 5: Upskilling by 2000 Skill Group
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In gure 5, we plot the coecients on

I 2015

shockm ∗ I 2010

(solid blue line) and

shockm ∗

(dashed red line), respectively, smoothed with local linear regression. These summary

measures thus depict the size of the initial upskilling eect and the size of the remaining
eect at the end of the sample period.

In most cases the two sets of coecients are are

quite close to each other, implying that the majority of the upskilling eects are persistent
within occupation categories.

Almost all coecients are statistically dierent from zero

(except for the lowest-wage occupations in the cognitive and computer specications) and
economically meaningful.

We also see a fairly similar pattern across dependent variables:

upskilling at relatively higher rates at low and high modes of the skill distribution, though
in most cases (education, experience, computer), the low mode shows less persistence than
the higher one. Together, these results suggest upskilling is broad-based across occupations,
although the eects are particularly pronounced and persistent in the upper-middle of the
skill distribution.
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Beaudry, Green, and Sand (2014, 2016) document that more-educated workers have increased their employment in lower-skilled jobs since 2000. They term this shift, along with

44 Although minimum wage increases during the Great Recession have been shown to have sizable, negative
employment eects for the low-skilled (Clemens and Wither 2014, Clemens 2015), our results are unlikely to
be driven by a binding minimum wage that causes rms to seek more-skilled workers as a means of lowering
the eective skill price in a downturn. Occupations higher in the skill distribution, where we show upskilling
eects to be strongest, are unlikely to face binding minimum wages. More general downward wage rigidities
(see Shimer 2004 and Hall 2005) may yield a similar eect; however, wages of new job matches have been
shown to be much more cyclical, once selection is taken into account (Martins, Solon, and Thomas 2012).
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stagnating employment in cognitive occupations, the great reversal in the demand for cognitive skill.
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They hypothesize that lessened demand for cognitive occupations induces

college graduates to take jobs lower in the skill distribution, squeezing out less-educated
workers who formerly held these jobs. In light of the evidence above, we propose that any
declining demand in cognitive occupations was accompanied by an increased demand for
cognitive skill

within

routine-task occupations, and this shift accelerated in the Great Reces-

sion. Even as employment has shifted from routine to cognitive occupations, the remaining
routine occupations themselves are becoming less routine and more cognitive.

Our work

thus highlights an alternative hypothesis for why high-skilled workers are increasingly found
in lower-skilled occupations: these latter occupations are becoming more skilled, and it is
possible that less-skilled workers are displaced because they are unable to perform the new
duties required.

4.3

Upskilling and Traded Products

We exploit cross-sectional variation in how MSAs bore the Great Recession to understand
the broader impact of recessions on skill demand. However, the models from the literature
discussed abovewhich predict productivity-enhancing improvements will be concentrated
in recessionsgenerate an additional prediction when using local shocks: upskilling eects
should be more pronounced in sectors producing locally-consumed goods and services. Unlike
the tradeable sector, the product demand for which is largely determined by markets farther
away or diused across many areas, rms producing locally-consumed goods and services
are highly sensitive to local demand shocks, and thus should be more greatly aected by the
variation we identify with the Bartik employment measure. To the extent that upskilling is
driven by shifts from dying, low-productivity rms to new rms with modern production, or
because surviving rms choose to adjust when the opportunity cost of temporarily stopping
production is low or when layos are already necessary, the phenomenon should be more
pronounced in our analytic strategy among rms selling products at the local level.
To classify sectors, we adopt two well-known measures of the degree to which production
is oshorable. The rst, from Blinder and Krueger (2013), is based primarily on workers'
survey responses to questions of location requirements to do their jobs. We create an index
equal to the average of Blinder and Krueger's three preferred measures, which are available
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at the two-digit NAICS level.

The second, from Jensen and Kleitzer (2005), is based on

geographic concentration of employment in the industry.

Intuitively, if employment for a

sector can be geographically concentrated (e.g., software developers in Silicon Valley) then

45 See also Castex and Dechter (2014) and Deming (2015).
46 Blinder and Krueger's (2013) three preferred measures are based on (1) self-classication: whether
the respondents believe their duties can be performed remotely or must be done on-site; (2) inferred:
determined from questions about location requirements of the job; and (3) externally coded: how expert
coders categorize jobs based on typical survey questions on industry and occupation.
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output for that sector is more likely traded and need not be consumed locally. From Jensen
and Kleitzer, we obtain the share of employment (in the two-digit NAICS sector) that can
be categorized as

least

geographically concentrated.

47

In equation 3, we estimate the change in skill requirements within (two-digit NAICS)
sector ,

s,

as a function of the Bartik shock, and we allow this eect to vary with the

degree to which the sector produces locally consumed products (locals ). We augment our
base controls with sector xed eects, to control for the main eect of

local

and other

unobservables that would generate variation in skill demand growth across sectors.

(3)

skillsmt −skillsm07 = α0 +[shock m ∗I t ]α1 +[locals ∗shockm ∗I t ]α2 +I t +I sector +Xm β+εomt .
Figure 6 uses the Blinder-Krueger composite oshorability measure and ts impacts for

non-traded (10th percentile) and traded (90th percentile) sectors with solid blue and dashed
maroon lines, respectively.

We nd that increases in skill requirements are

larger

in the

non-traded sectors. This is true for experience, cognitive skills and computer skills, where
the dierentials are statistically signicant and eects for the traded sectors are essentially
zero. In contrast, for education, both traded and non-traded sectors see signicant increases
in skill requirements, and the dierences between them are small.
For comparison, appendix gure D2 shows results using the Jensen-Kleitzer geographic
concentration measure.

We nd that the least concentrated sectors (and therefore likely

the least oshorable) see substantially larger upskilling.

This again holds for experience,

cognitive skill, and computer skill, with magnitudes similar to the Blinder-Krueger measure,
even though the measures are based on dierent methodologies.
These results help conrm the hypothesized mechanism for upskilling.

Other expla-

nations, such as temporary opportunistic upskilling, do not predict specic heterogeneous
impacts across sectors, and are motivated by the availability of (homogeneous) skilled labor.
The fact that we see little to no dierential eect for education requirements across sectors
suggests that upskilling may reect multiple factors . However, the bulk of the evidence supports the hypothesisthat upskilling eects are concentrated in the least-traded sectorsthe
ones most sensitive to local consumer demand.
These within-sector estimates also help address a concern about the Bartik shock, which
uses for identication national changes in employment growth by three-digit NAICS industry
and MSA-level industry composition. Suppose that the industries driving negative employment shocks are precisely those that experience contemporaneous technology shocksand
that concomitant temporary employment declines during an adjustment period. In this case
our results would not indicate that rms concentrated their

adoption of existing technologies

47 Jensen and Kleitzer (2005) measure geographic dispersion across MSAs of employment in detailed industry categories, and designate the category least concentrated as those industries with a Gini coecient
less than

0.1.
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Figure 6: Upskilling by Sector Tradability, based on Blinder-Krueger Oshorability
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Bartik shock*year effects interacted with offshorability, fitted for 90th and 10th percentiles.
Regressions also control for sector and year fixed effects and MSA characteristics.

in recessions but rather that the occurrence of the innovations themselves was concentrated
in the recession. The fact that our results obtain even within sector alleviates this concern.
Holding constant the national change in skill requirements for a sector (and therefore also

48

any coincident innovation in the sector), we still nd evidence of upskilling.

That is, for

a given sector, when a rm is located in a harder-hit MSA, it increases skill requirements,
while a rm producing in the same sector but in a less hard-hit MSA does not.

Our hy-

pothesized mechansim is that the aggregate consumer demand shock generated by the Bartik
instrument reduces adjustment costs and enables rms to adopt existing technologies and/or
increases the exit of low-productivity rms.

5

Heterogeneity across Firms

The evidence presented thus far shows a persistent shift in job requirements toward workers
with greater education, experience, and cognitive and computer skills in MSAs more severely
aected by the Great Recession.

This pattern is consistent with recessions accelerating

adoption of routine-biased technologies.

This accelerated technological adoption could be

48 In the estimates underlying gure 6 and appendix gure D2, we still nd that the sector with average
oshorability experiences statistically signicant upskilling.

Our results hold at the more disaggregated

three-digit NAICS level, the same level underlying the Bartik shock. Furthermore, we have also explored
using variation in housing price shocks to generate variation in local demand and obtained qualitatively
similar results.

25

driven by substitution from failing low-productivity rms to new high-productivity rms, as a
cleansing model of recessions would predict (Schumpeter 1939). In addition, surviving rms
may concentrate the timing of new technological adoption around recessions because of lower
adjustment costs. Many classes of models in macroeconomics generate these consequences,
although sparse direct evidence exists in support of these models.
In this section, we decompose the upskilling eect into changes within and across rms
and occupations to better understand which mechanisms are at play.

We nd that both

between- and within-rm adjustments are important drivers of upskilling.

We then focus

specically on within-rm changes in skill requirements, a unique capability of our data,
in order to test additional predictions that support the hypothesis that upskilling is driven
primarily by accelerated adoption of new technologies.

In our argument, once a rm up-

grades its workforce, presumably with a concomitant upgrade in machines and technology or
overseas infrastructure, the changes should remain. That is, if rms are changing what they
do, not simply whom they hire, those changes will endure. We thus investigate rm-level
changes in skill requirements and other factors of production, notably use of capital, and nd
that the same rms that increased their advertised skill requirements also increased their
capital stocks the most, another pattern consistent with restructuring of production.

5.1

Decomposing Upskilling Within and Across Firms

We here explore the extent to which upskilling is driven by shifts in postings from old to
new rms and changes within existing rms.

By employing a formal decomposition, we

investigate these margins simultaneously with shifts in ads across rms and those across
occupations.
Dene
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Ct

as the set of rm-MSAs that post ads in both year

t and in 2007.

We hereafter

refer to these as continuing rms, and the set of rm-MSAs that have posts only in 2007
or only in

t

as non-continuing rms.

continuing rms.

50

In our sample, 54% of weighted observations are to

We hope to understand the extent to which substitution across dying

and newly born rms aects overall changes in skill requirements, though it is important to
note that we cannot distinguish whether a rm does not post in a given period because it
has no vacancies (e.g., a hiring freeze) or because it does not exist.
and year t as a
C
C
51 Nf mt
function of: pmt , the share of ads in an MSA-year posted in continuing rms;
C , the
Nmt
In equation (4), we express the average skill requirement in MSA

m

49 Kahn and McEntarfer (2015) show that workers matching to jobs in downturns are more likely to match
to low-paying rms than high-paying rms.

50 Here we dene rm as the group of ads with the same employer name in the same MSA, which allows

us to take advantage of the cross-sectional variation in how MSAs bore the Great Recession. The set

Ct

is

dened separately for each year from 20102015, though naturally there is substantial overlap in the set of
continuing rms across years.

51 By denition,

pC
mt ≡

C
Nmt
C +N N C .
Nmt
mt
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distribution of ads across continuing rms in

mt ;

C
Nof
mt

NfCmt

, the distribution of ads across occu-

C
skillof
mt , the average skill requirement for continuing
NC
Nomt
rm f , posting in occupation o, MSA m, and year t;
N C , the distribution of ads across
Nmt
52
¯ N C , the average skill requirement for
occupations among non-continuing rms;
andskill
omt
occupation o, among all non-continuing rms in mt (that is, the average skill requirement
pations for a given continuing rm;

in the occupation-MSA-year among rm-MSAs that posted either only in 2007 or only in
period

t ).

(4)

skillmt = pC
mt

C
X X NfCmt Nof
mt
f m∈Ct

C
Nmt
NfCmt

o

N¯
C
X Nomt
C
C
C
∗ skillof
+
(1
−
p
)
∗ skillN
omt .
mt
mt
NC
N
mt
o

We then decompose the eect of the Bartik employment shock on the overall change
in skill requirements at the MSA-year level (skillmt

− skillm07 ),

into eects attributable

tochanges in these components. We provide the full details of this decomposition in appendix
B, and here simply summarize key results.
In gure 7, we report the fraction of the overall impact of
tributed to each component.

53

shock

in the given year at-

To make the graph easier to read, we combine some compo-

nents together, focusing on the (empirically) most important.
The lightest bar shows the fraction of the overall upskilling eect in each year attributable

C
to changes in the distribution of rms, combining the share of ads to continuing rms pmt
C
Nf mt 54
with the rm distribution among continuing rms
The next lightest bar shows the
C .
Nmt
fraction attributable to changes in the occupation distribution, combining the occupation
C
Nof
N NC
mt
distribution among continuing ( C ) and non-continuing ( omt
N C ) rms. Across all dependent
Nf mt
Nmt
variables, we nd that changes in these rm and occupation distributions account for very
little of the upskilling eects.
Instead, the vast majority of the upskilling eect is split across the two darker bars.
The darkest bar shows the fraction attributable to changes in skill requirements of non-

¯ N C ). It compares, for each occupation, the skill
continuing rms for a given occupation (skill
omt
requirements for rms that posted only in the later period (20102015) to the requirements
for rms that stopped posting after 2007. The adjacent, next-darkest bars show the fraction
attributable to the change in skill requirements between 2007 and
MSAs.

55

t

among continuing rm-

Across dependent variables and years, each of these two components contributes

52 Since, by denition, non-continuing rms cannot be matched across time periods, we aggregate over all
non-continuing rms.

53 Naturally, the order in which we perform the decomposition will matter for the relative importance of

the components. Here each fraction represents the average contribution across all possible decomposition
orders. More details are provided in the appendix.

54 Appendix table B1 separates these two eects, shown in columns 1 and 2. We nd that the share of ads

to continuing rms is the more important component, especially in the later years.

55 This component includes both the change in skill requirements within rm-occupation-MSAs for rms

that posted in a given

occupation

in both periods, and changes in skill requirements driven by continuing
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Figure 7: Decomposing Upskilling Into Within and Across Firm Components
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We decompose the impact of the MSA-specific Bartik employment shock on the change in skill requirements from 2007 in each year.
We then plot the share attributed to each components, averaged across all possible decomposition orders.

to roughly half of the upskilling eect. These results are thus consistent with both the rm
birth-death substitution eect à la Schumpeter and the importance of within-rm episodic
restructuring.

5.2

Within-Firm Changes

The decomposition shows that roughly half of the upskilling eect in each year can be
accounted for by within-continuing-rm changes in skill requirements. This dimension merits
further exploration since, while many of the models that generate episodic restructuring
consider rm-level responses to the changing costs and benets of adopting new technologies,
there is essentially no direct evidence on the matter.

In addition to the prediction that

skill requirements should increase within rms (as shown above), these models generate
two additional implications that we can test in our data:

(1) increases in a rm's skill

requirements should endure, and (2) upskilling should be accompanied by increases in capital
stock.
We divide rms into (posting-weighted) quartiles based on changes in skill requirements
between 2007 and 2010; we then plot the average skill requirements for each quartile over
rm-MSAs that post for dierent occupations. The summary measure plotted in gure 7 sums these two
eects, but they are shown separately in appendix table B1, columns 3 and 5. Empirically, we nd that both
are important; the former is more important for education and experience requirements, while the two are
roughly equally important for cognitive and computer requirements.
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Figure 8: Skill Requirements by Firm 2007-2010 Change
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Graph plots average skill requirement by year and quartile of 2007-10 firm-level skill change.
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time in gure 8.

Firms began at fairly similar average skill levels in 2007, although this sim-

ilarity is not imposed by our exercise. By construction there is a sharp contrast across rm
quartiles in 2010, with the darker shaded lines representing rms with larger skill increases.
Interestingly, and not by construction, these quartiles remain spread apart throughout the
remainder of the sample period, and by 2015, rms in the higher quartiles still had substantially higher skill requirements in their

new

ads than rms in the lower quartiles.

This within-rm persistence in upskilling holds up in regression analysis and is substantial. Though not shown, we nd that, on average, 6070% of a rm's increase in skill
requirements between 2007 and 2010 persists through 2015. Estimates are even larger when
we instrument for the initial increase in upskilling with the Bartik shock. It could have been
the case that the majority of rms increased skill requirements during the recession and
reverted back later in the recovery (for example, in an attempt to opportunistically recruit
while markets were slack), with higher skill demand in later years unrelated to the recession.
Instead we nd that upskilling late in the recovery is driven by the same rms that initially
upskilled during the Great Recession. These results thus provide further support for models
of episodic restructuring.
An RBTC explanation would also suggest that rms automate routine tasks with ma-

56 We exploit the subsample of rms in our data that post at least ve observations in each of 2007 and
2010, comprising 66% of weighted observations. Column 2 of appendix table D2 shows that the probability
of satisfying this restriction does not vary with the local labor market shock. Quartiles are dened separately
for each skill measure, weighting by the rm average number of posts across 2007-2010.
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chines (or cheaper, outsourced labor), which complement skilled labor. If mechanization is
occurring, then rms should also invest in physical capital around the time that they upskill.

57

We investigate directly whether the rms that upskilled simultaneously increased

investment. We do so by linking the publicly traded rms in our data to Compustat North
America by Standard & Poors (hereafter Compustat), the most complete database of U.S.
rm accounting and balance sheet data.
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While we cannot identify IT investment speci-

cally in the Compustat data, we can measure a rm's overall holdings of property, plant, and
equipment (PPENT). This measure of capital stock includes IT investments and, under the
RBTC hypothesis, should increase faster for rms mechanizing or using more sophisticated
production technology.
We match rms to Compustat using rm name and provide details of the matching
procedure in Appendix A.4.
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Figure 9 provides a general sense of the relationship between

upskilling and investment. We present binned scatter plots of the change in skill requirements
between 2007 and 2010 on the rate of change in capital stock (PPENT) over the same time
period.
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There is a strong and highly signicant positive relationship for all the skills

measures. Firms that had larger increases in skill requirements between 2007 and 2010 also

61

had larger increases in capital stock over the same time period.

We also provide results from regression analysis, analogous to those presented in gure
1, comparing the impact of the Bartik shock across rms with dierent capital investment
behavior. We estimate regressions similar to that in equation (1) but control for the rm's
change in capital stock between 2007 and 2010, and allow this variable to interact with the

shock -year

62

eects.

Figure 10 ts the dierential impact (and 90% condence interval) of

the Bartik shock for rms at the 90th and 10th percentiles of capital change. The former
had a 60% increase in their capital stock while the latter experienced a 20% drop.
We nd that rms with larger increases in capital stock had greater upskilling, and these
dierences persist. In harder-hit MSAs, skill requirements increase roughly 30% (education

57 This may seem at odds with the stylized facts on the cyclicality of investment. However, Jaimovich
and Siu (2012), show that investment in information processing equipment and software bounced back
immediately following the end of the NBER-dated recession (December 2007 through June 2009), while
domestic private investment was much more sluggish. IT and computers are exactly the technologies that
drive RBTC (Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenan 2014).

58 We obtain these data via Wharton Research Data Services.
59 We can link 46% of weighted observations from the 20072010 change sample used in gure 8 to a

business in Compustat. In column 3 of appendix table D2, we show that the change in the share of rms
matching to Compustat does not vary with the Bartik shock.

60 We aggregate the rms into percentiles based on the magnitude of changes in skill requirements (weighted

by the average number of ads posted in 2007 and 2010); we then plot for each percentile bin the ad-weighted
average of this variable against the ad-weighted average of the change in capital stock.

61 The gure would look similar if instead of actual rm upskilling we used predicted rm-specic upskilling

measures based on variation in the Bartik shock.

62 Regressions are estimated at the rm-MSA-year level for the Compustat matched sample. Capital change

varies at the rm level but we disaggregate to rm-MSA to take advantage of variation in local labor market
conditions. These can be thought of as estimating the relationship between upskilling and capital change as
a function of the Bartik shock in locations where the rm tends to post.
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Figure 9: Firm-Level Changes in Skill Requirements and Capital Stock 20072010
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Figure 10: Dierential Upskilling by 90-10 Change in Firm Capital Stock
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Graphs plots the coefficients on the Bartik shock*year interacted with the firm-level capital change,
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Regressions also control for year fixed effects and MSA characteristics.

31

and experience requirements) to about 50% (cognitive and computer requirements) more
in high-investment rms than in low-investment rms. These dierences are all signicant,
typically at the 1% level. Thus, throughout our sample period, rms with larger increases
in capital stock around the time of the Great Recession also had larger increases in their
posted skill requirements.

6

Discussion

Thus far, we have shown that job postings in harder-hit MSAs experienced larger increases
in their education, experience, cognitive, and computer requirements following the Great
Recession. Furthermore, these requirements remained elevated through the end of our sample
in 2015, even as most measures of labor market conditions had converged back to their
pre-recession levels. These increased skill requirements are robust to controls for the local
supply of skill availability and occur broadly withinand not just acrossa wide range of
occupations, and are concentrated in sectors that are more susceptible to local demand shocks
and rms that also increased their capital stock. Furthermore, as best as we can measure,
the changes in stated skill preferences translate to actual changes in realized employment.
We believe the most likely explanation for these facts is that the recession accelerated
adoption of existing technologies. Demand for skill changed because the means of production
changed, and this process was episodic, catalyzed by the Great Recession. Theoretical models that can generate this kind of lumpy adjustment posit several possible mechanisms:
substitution across old and new rms (Schumpeter 1939, Caballero and Hammour 1994,
1996), or greater eciency to within-rm adjustments when the opportunity cost of adjusting is lower (Hall 2005), when managerial attention is more focused on eciency (Koender
and Rogerson 2005), or when layos are necessary, anyway (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994,
Berger 2012).

Using specic empirical skill measures that reect what the discipline has

learned about technological change over the past 20 years (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003;
Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011), we nd evidence consistent with these mechanisms: about
half of the upskilling eect is driven by substitution across old and new rms and half is due
to within-rm changes. Within continuing rms, changes in skill requirements are persistent and accompanied by changes in capital stock, consistent with increased mechanization.
Finally, upskilling is more pronounced in sectors more sensitive to local consumer demand,
those for which restructuring costs are likely to be lower in downturns.
While rms may respond to changes in labor market conditions through posted skill
requirements for a variety of other reasons, these cannot rationalize our full body of ndings.
For example, rms may worry that a ood of applicants early in the recovery will create
a bottleneck in screening, and therefore try to signal that certain (unwanted) applicants
need not apply. However, this would not explain the accompanying changes in employment
that we nd, nor would it generate persistent increases in skill requirements independent of
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the available supply of labor (as proxied by the unemployment rate).
It could instead be the case that rms that cannot attract (or aord) more-skilled workers

63

in a tight labor market opportunistically seek them out in a slack one.

This mechanism

would again predict short-lived upskilling eects that would be driven by the local availability
of skilled labor. We do see some evidence consistent with opportunistic upskilling, though
it cannot be the primary driver of our results.

As we noted, controls for unemployment

rates in our regressions do aect estimated coecients on the Bartik shock early in the
recovery (when unemployment is high) but have no eect on estimated coecients in later
years (when unemployment has recovered but skill requirements have not). Commensurately,
holding constant the overall size of the Bartik shock on an MSA, a larger increase in the
college graduate unemployment rate between 2007 and 2010 generates greater increases in
skill requirements early in the recovery, but these eects dissipate.
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Furthermore, there is

no reason to think that opportunistic upskilling should be concentrated in the non-tradeable
sector or accompanied by increases in capital stock.
Indeed, the concentration and persistence of the elevated skill demand provides substantial evidence in favor of our hypothesis, since most alternative explanations predict convergence when the economy recovers.

While it is possible that labor markets are slower to

recover than unemployment rates and employment levels suggest, it is telling that we nd
little overall convergence in skill requirements as markets improve, even though the data

do

indicate convergence in some occupations (primarily on the low end of the skill distribution;
see gure 5).
In our view, the only remaining alternative hypothesis is that changes in labor supply
later in the recovery induce changes in skill demand. For example, availability of skilled labor
might increase later in the recovery due to dierential quit behavior or changes in educational
attainment brought on by the Great Recession. In either case changes in the availability of
skilled labor would be correlated with the Bartik shock, but might be uncorrelated with
unemployment rates.
First, we point out that this kind of explanation is hard to reconcile with the result
that upskilling later in the recovery is driven by the same rms that upskilled early in the
recovery (gure 8). If early upskilling is driven by bottlenecks and overall unemployment,
while later upskilling is driven by quits and a more-educated workforce, then there is no
particular reason why the two should be linked.

Second, we have directly examined the

timing of quits and educational attainment as a function of the Bartik shock. We conclude
that these eects cannot be important drivers of our result. See appendix C for details.
Simply put, the evidence supports that changes in skill requirements reect changes in

63 Even though it is well known that recessions disproportionately aect low-skilled workers (Hoynes, Miller,
and Schaller 2012), making high-skilled workers

relatively more costly and less available, it is still possible

that high-skilled workers suciently reduce their reservation wage to become worthwhile hires to rms that
generally employ the less skilled.

64 See appendix C.
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production, not simply changes in whom rms ask for.

7

Conclusion

During the recovery following the Great Recession, anecdotal evidence suggested that the
composition of new hires shifted toward higher-skilled workers, resulting in many workers
being overeducated for their jobs (Burning Glass Technologies 2014). However, it was not
clear how broad, deep, or enduring these eects were, or the extent to which they were
driven by labor supply or labor demand responses. In particular, rms may have treated the
recession as a time of cleansing, enabling them to restructure their production in a manner
consistent with routine-biased technological change. In this paper we draw upon detailed job
postings data to provide comprehensive, broad-based evidence of upskillingrms demanding higher-skilled workerswhen the local economy suers a recession. We present a range
of evidence that consistently supports our hypothesis that this eect is primarily driven by
an episodic restructuring on the part of rms and thus is likely to be long-lasting.
This paper thus provides the rst direct evidence that the Great Recession accelerated
routine-biased technological change, and in so doing touches on a number of literatures and
policy questions. It is consistent with the important, but suggestive, evidence provided by
Jaimovich and Siu (2015) that the vast majority of employment lost in routine occupations
was lost during recessions and never recovered. It also contributes to the many models in
macroeconomics that assume adjustment costs and imply that recessions will be times of
cleansing in terms of production (Schumpeter 1939, Koenders and Rogerson 2005, Berger
2012). As hypothesized by many, these kinds of episodic, productivity-enhancing changes
can result in jobless recovery. Our ndings are thus extremely relevant for policy makers,
who allocate billions of taxpayer dollars to subsidize workers' job searches in a downturn.
We also demonstrate how electronic job postings data can provide a unique opportunity
to understand real-time changes in skill demand both across and within occupations. This
level of detail can provide new insight relative to earlier literature.
that occupations

themselves

We are able to show

are changing. Many occupations were likely already drawing

in higher-skilled workers before the Great Recession, and as we show, this eect accelerated
during the recession and subsequent recovery. This can help to clarify studies by Beaudry,
Green, and Sand (2014, 2016) and others documenting the great reversal in demand for
cognitive skill. While it is certainly the case that employment in high-skill occupations has
not grown, on average, over the past decade, our results show that cognitive workers still
retain a substantial advantage over the low-skilled. They are drawn into formerly middleskill jobs, which are becoming higher-skilled. We can thus explain why skilled workers still
earn a premium in the labor market even though the returns to cognitive occupations appear
to have diminished.
The U.S. economy has seen remarkable changes over the past 30 years, brought on by
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the computer revolution and globalization.

These changes have led to great increases in

productivity and wealth, but the benets have not been shared across all workers. Indeed,
mounting evidence suggests that a large population of workers, formerly employed in routinetask jobs, have suered permanent labor market, health, and social consequences from the
structural changes in the economy (Autor et al.

2014; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2015;

Foote and Ryan 2015; Pierce and Schott 2015). Our results highlight that a worker's ability
to adjust to these changes may be especially dicult because the changes are episodic,
concentrated in recessions. Thus large numbers of workers can nd their skills depreciated
at the same time.

This is perhaps evident in the stair-step declines in male labor force

participation that have tended to be concentrated around recessions (Mott 2012, Foote
and Ryan 2015).

If the changes to production instead occurred more gradually, workers

would still need to be retrained, but over a longer time period, and on a much smaller scale
at any given time. Future policy work should be directed at understanding how to reallocate
workers on a large scale following a recession.
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A

Data Appendix

It is estimated that as of 2014 between 60% and 70% of all job postings could be found online
(Carnevale, Jayasundera, and Repnikov 2014). Indeed, The Conference Board discontinued
its-long-running, print-based Help-Wanted Advertising Index in 2008, after having begun a
Help-Wanted Online Index in 2005 (HWOL).
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Several other private-sector rms also began

to track online job postings in the 2000s by using web-crawling and data-scraping methods.
In this study, we employ data from one such rm, Burning Glass Technologies. This appendix
discusses the representativeness of the data and investigates whether representativeness has
changed over the time period of analysis.

A.1

Occupation-Industry Composition in BG

The BG database covers only vacancies posted on the Internet, as opposed to JOLTS or
state vacancy reports that directly survey a representative sample of employers.

To the

extent that vacancies from certain industries and occupations are less likely to be posted
electronically, as might be the case for many less-skilled jobs, they will be underrepresented
in the data.

66

It is also possible that the BG database is not representative even of online job

postings, as comprehensiveness rests on the strength of the company's algorithms to code
information in the ads and get rid of duplicates.

Carnevale, Jayasundera, and Repnikov

(2014) show that the occupation-industry composition of the BG data are similar to that
of the Conference Board's HWOL. Moreover, the authors audited a sample of job postings
in the BG database and compared them to the actual text of the postings, nding that the
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codings for occupation, education, experience were at least 80% accurate.

Figure A1 plots the distribution of BG ads across major industry groups, sorted from
largest to smallest (solid bars), as well as the distribution of job vacancies in JOLTS
(diagonal-lined bars). As mentioned, the BG database is meant to capture only electronically posted job ads; the universes of the data sources are thus not identical, but JOLTS is

68

the best comparison available.

Despite the sample dierences, the industry distributions

65 See https://www.conference-board.org/data/helpwantedonline.cfm.
66 Rothwell (2014) compares the occupational distributions from an extract of BG to those from state
vacancy surveys for select metropolitan areas for which data are available. He nds that computer, management, and business occupations are overrepresented relative to the state vacancy surveys, while health care
support, transportation, maintenance, sales, and food service workers are underrepresented.

67 Furthermore, since BG regularly revises and attempts to improve its algorithms (applying them retroac-

tively on the complete historical database of postings), and our extract is more recent than the one studied
by Carnevale, Jayasundera, and Repnikov, it seems reasonable that their accuracy gure would be a lower
bound for our sample.

68 Both data sets cover 2007 and 20102014 (the most recent full years available from JOLTS at the time

of this writing). The BG distribution is from our primary estimation sample (notably excluding ads with
missing rms), though we obtain similar results for the distribution across all ads. JOLTS data are based
on a monthly, nationally representative sample of approximately 16,000 business establishments drawn from
unemployment insurance records; they count as a vacancy or job opening any position (including temporary
and seasonal ones) that could start within 30 days and that the employer is actively trying to ll through a
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Figure A1: Industry Distributions: BG, JOLTS: 2007, 2010-2014
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match each other reasonably well. BG is overrepresented in health care and social assistance,
as well as in nance and insurance and education.

It is underrepresented in accommoda-

tion and food services, public administration/government, and construction. However, most
dierences are small in magnitude.
A great advantage of the BG data over the JOLTS is that they allow us to categorize
jobs by occupation at a detailed level. We thus also compare the occupational distribution
of BG job ads to both the stock and ow of employment in the United States. We should
not expect online job ads to precisely match either comparison group since occupations dier
in turnover rates that would necessitate new hires (ows), and since they also dier in the
extent to which they use vacancy postings (rather than informal hiring channels) to ll a
slot. However, these comparisons help build intuition for the BG data set.
Figure A2 plots the distribution of BG ads across major occupation groups, sorted from

69

largest to smallest (green bars).

We show the distribution of the stock of employment

based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) data
(light blue, horizontal lines). We also show the occupational distribution of new job starts
(job ows) based on longitudinally linked Current Population Survey (CPS) data (dark blue,
variety of means, of which posting a job ad (electronic or otherwise) is only one.

69 For clarity, we use 2-digit Standard Occupational Classication codes in the gure.

analyses use more granular codings.
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The regression

Figure A2: Occupation Distributions: BG, New Jobs (CPS) and Employment (OES)
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Perhaps not unexpectedly, BG has a much larger representation of computer and mathematical occupations, more than four times the OES and CPS shares. BG is also overrepresented among management, healthcare practitioners, and business and nancial operations,
although to lesser degrees. On the other hand, BG data are underrepresented in many of
the remaining occupationsfor example, in transportation, food preparation and serving,
production, and construction. The OES and CPS distributions agree more closely, although
there are notable gaps among occupations known to have very high (or very low) rates of
turnover.

A.2

Representativeness of BG Data over Time

As noted in the text, our primary concern is that the representativeness of the sample
changes over time. This would be a threat to internal validity in our analysis. Figure A3
gives a general sense of whether the representativeness of BG has changed over our sample

70 All data sets cover 2007 and 20102014. (2014 is the most recent year for which OES data were available
at the time of this writing.) The BG distribution is from our primary estimation sample, though, again, the
distribution is similar for the full sample of ads. We dene a new hire in the CPS as an individual who,
from month

t to month t+1, transitioned from non-employment to employment, reported a new employer,

or reported changing occupations.
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Deviation from CPS 2010-2015
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Figure A3: Representativeness of BG Occupations, Relative to New Jobs (CPS)
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The x-axis is the BG ad share in an occupation in 2007 minus the CPS new job share in the same occupation in 2007.
The y-axis is these differences for each year from 2010-2015. Darker shades are earlier years, lighter shades are later.

period. On the x-axis we plot the deviation of the BG occupation share in 2007 from that
occupation's share of CPS new job starts in the same year.

For example, computer and

mathematical occupations are shown on the far right at roughly 11 percentage points (ppts)
overrepresentation in BG compared to CPS. Construction is on the far left at roughly 7 ppts
underrepresented. On the y-axis we plot the deviation of the BG occupation share from its
CPS share for each of the later years in the data.

The markers are color-coded by year.

The darkest markers plot the (2007, 2010) representativeness pair for each occupation; the
lightest markers plot the (2007, 2015) representativeness pair. We also plot the 45-degree
line as a benchmark: if representativeness of the BG data, relative to the CPS, remained
constant over time, all markers should line up on the 45-degree line.
The gure shows that changes in representativeness over this time period are very small
(most of the markers are close to the 45 degree line). To the extent that changes did occur,
there is a tendency for them to have been in the direction of closer representativeness to the
CPS. Computer and mathematical occupations, management occupations, and architecture
and engineering occupations appear to have become less overrepresented, while health care
and business and nance look fairly unchanged; administrative support, food, transportation,
and production occupations have become slightly less underrepresented. For most of these
occupations, though, the dierences are quite small.
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A.3

Skills Measures in BG

One of the most unique features of the BG data is the availability of skills measures. We
argue that these stated preferences are informative about labor demand.

We have also

investigated, to the best of our ability, the degree to which these stated preferences translate
into realized hires.
Figures A4a and A4b crosscheck the average education requirements in BG with average education levels of employed workers at the MSA- and occupation-level, respectively.
Using American Community Survey (ACS) data for overlapping sampling years, we rank
both MSAs and occupations (four-digit SOC codes) by their average education of employed
workers and plot the relationships between average education requirements and average education for 20 evenly sized employment bins, using smoothed local linear regression. As can
be seen, at the levels of both MSA and occupation, the probability that an ad posts any
education requirement is increasing with the average years schooling of employed workers
(top left), as is the years of school conditional on any requirement (top right). Furthermore,
the probability that an ad has a high school requirement is positively correlated with the
share of workers that have exactly a high school diploma (bottom left), and the probability
that an ad has a college requirement is positively correlated with the share of workers with
exactly a bachelor's degree (bottom right).

A.4

Compustat Sample

Beginning with the 10,436 rms used to construct the 20072010 change sample (7.4% of
rms and 66% of weighted observations, used in gure 8), we employ a sequential matching
procedure.

We rst match based on exact name, after cleaning to remove punctuation

and words that are sometimes abbreviated (e.g., Inc.). This step accounts for 81% of all
Compustat-matched rms and 76% of matches based on our sample weights. Second, we use
a fuzzy-match program called Winpure and assign a match if the program determines at least
a 95% probability of a match (5% of matched rms and matched weighted observations).
Third, we add the sample of rms matched by Deming and Kahn (2016), which uses only
BG rms posting in 2014. We thus match a total of 46% of weighted observations from the
20072010 change sample, or 30% of weighted observations in the sample as a wholethough
we did not attempt to match observations that did not meet the 20072010 change criteria.

71

71 For context, the size of employment in Compustat is roughly half that of total employment in the U.S.
For example, in 2014, the sum of employment listed in companies in Compustat was 70,505,000 and total
payroll employment averaged 139,042,000. The Compustat employment gure includes both domestic and
foreign workers, with no way to distinguish between the two. However, the employment comparison provides
a useful benchmark.
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Figure A4: Comparison of BG Education Requirements and ACS Employment
(a) by MSA
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(b) by Occupation
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B

Firm-Occupation Decomposition

The decomposition explored in section 5.1 begins with equation (4), repeated here for convenience:

skillmt = pC
mt

C
X X NfCmt Nof
mt
f m∈Ct

o

C
Nmt
NfCmt

N¯
C
X Nomt
C
C
C
∗ skillof
+
(1
−
p
)
∗ skillN
mt
mt
omt .
NC
N
mt
o

Using this equation, we decompose the change in skill requirements in MSA,

m

from

t

C
2007 to year , into: pmt , the share of ads in an MSA-year posted in continuing rms;
C
C
Nf mt
Nof
mt
, the distribution of ads across continuing rms in
;
, the distribution of ads
C
Nmt
NfCmt
C
across occupations for a given continuing rm; skillof mt , the average skill requirement for
N NC
continuing rm f , posting in occupation o, MSA m, and year t; omt
N C , the distribution of ads
Nmt
N
C
¯
across occupations among non-continuing rms; andskill
omt , the average skill requirement

mt

for occupation

o, among all non-continuing rms in mt (that is, the average skill requirement

in the occupation-MSA-year among rm-MSAs that posted either only in 2007 or only in
period

t ).

In practice, this equation is not exact for two reasons.

First, continuing rms do not

necessarily post to the same set of occupations in each period (so

C
skillof
mt

would not be de-

ned for some occupation-rm-MSA-year combinations but might be dened in, say, 2007).
Second, the set of non-continuing rms does not post to the same set of occupations (so likewise
in

¯ NC ,
skill
omt

omt,

which is the average skill requirement among all non-continuing rms posting

would not be dened for some occupation-MSA-year combinations). To get around

these issues, we simply aggregate up from the occupation-rm-MSA-year level to either the
occupation-MSA-year level or the MSA-year level, the point where we get a match.
The exact denition is shown in equation (5).

1
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mt

In the top two lines, we divide the set of ads to continuing rms into three groups:
occupations that are posted in a given rm-MSA in both

t

and in 2007 (the set

CO1 ),

occupations that are not posted in a given rm-MSA in both periods but are posted among

2
other continuing rms in both periods (CO ), and occupations that are posted in one period
3
by continuing rms but not in the other period (CO ).
c
groups (π1 ,

π2c , and

1 − π1c

The ad shares for these three

− π2c , respectively) sum to one within the set of ads to continuing
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rms (Ct ).
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Averaging across 20102015 in our data, 54% of weighted observations are to

1
continuing rm-MSAs, of which 71% are to continuing occupations (CO ), 28% are to non2
continuing occupations that can still be matched to any other continuing rms (CO ) and
3
only 0.8% are to occupations that cannot be matched to any continuing rms (CO ).
1
The rst component, for continuing rm-occupations (CO ) is straightforward and is
dened by the within

CO1
average skill requirement (skillof mt ), the share of ads in this

of m

1

occupation,

o,

for the given

fm

(

CO
Nof
mt
1

NfCO
mt

), and the share of all ads in

CO1

that are by rm

f,

1

NfCO
mt

). The second components yields the average skill requirement among occupations by
CO 1
Nmt
continuing rms that do not post for the same occupation in both periods. The idea is that
(

we would like to compare the rm-occupation-specic requirement across years. However, in
some cases continuing rms post in a new occupation in t, so the comparison is not available.
Instead, we simply x occupations and aggregate over rms. We can then ask whether skill
requirements are more strenuous for continuing rms that enter into the occupation, relative

73

to those that exited the occupation..

o

2

CO
skillomt

is the average skill requirement in occupation

among rm-MSAs that posted some ads in both periods, but posted in occupation

o

2

in the given period, and

CO
Nomt
CO
Nmt

1

is the ad share for the given occupation among all ads in the

2
set (CO ). Finally, the third component,

¯ CO3 ,
skill
mt

is the average skill requirement in the

MSA-year for ads posted by continuing rms in occupations that belong to neither

CO

2

only

CO1

(that is, an occupation where continuing rms either post only in 2007 or only in

nor

t).

In the third line of equation (5), we divide the set of ads to non-continuing rms into two
groups: occupations that are posted in the MSA in both
those that are not (N CO

2

nc
), with weights π1 and

t

and in 2007 (the set

N CO1 )

and

1 − π1nc , respectively. Skill requirements for

the former are a function of the within-occupation average skill requirement among all ads
posted by non-continuing rms in

¯ N CO1 ) and the
mt in occupations that can be matched (skill
omt

share of ads that are posted to occupation

o,

(

N CO
Nomt

1

). The latter component is the average
N CO 1
Nmt
skill requirement among ads posted to non-continuing rms in mt in occupations that cannot

¯ N CO2 ).
be matched (skill
mt

Of the 46% of weighted observations that are to non-continuing

rms in our data, 97.5% of observations belong to the former (matched) group.
As noted in the text, we decompose the change in skill requirements for a given MSA,

m,

from 2007 to a given year

t (skillmt − skillm07 )

into these components. We do this by

generating counterfactual dierences that allow one component to change from its level in

72 These weights vary by MSA-year, but subscripts are surpressed for clarity.
73 We could instead x rms and aggregate over occupations. This allows us to ask whether the new
occupations the rm enters into have dierent skill requirements than the occupations the rm left. However
this yields far fewer matches, sincce it requires the rm-MSA to have at least one occupation it posted in
2007 but not

t and

at least one occupation it posted in

t but not 2007.

Many rm-MSAs either cease posting

t

in some occupations after 2007 or begin posting to new occupations in , but not both. Instead, aggregating
over rms and xing occupations requires that any continuing rm-MSA ceases posting in the occupation
after 2007 and any continuing rm-MSA begins posting in the occupation in
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t.

2007 to its level in

t,

holding all other components xed at the level in either period.

74

We

can regress this counterfactual skill change on the Bartik employment shock and the other
controls in equation (1) to understand how much of the total responsiveness is attributed to
a response in the within rm-MSA skill requirement.
A decomposition begins with

skillm07

and generates a counterfactual skill change distri-

bution that allows only one of the components to vary. That component is then xed at its
value at time

t and a second counterfactual skill change distribution is generated by allowing

a second component to vary, keeping all components but the rst two xed at their 2007
level. This process continues until all components are at their time

t

values. We can regress

each counterfactual change on the same variables in equation (1), and the coecients on

shock ∗ I t

will sum to the coecient on the full change reported earlier.

Naturally the order of the decomposition aects the relative importance of each component. For

p components in the decomposition, we have p! possible orders.

To reduce the state

space, we combine many of the variables in equation (5) into a smaller set of components
since they turn out to be empirically irrelevant.
We reduce the space to six components, resulting in 720 possible permutations.

We

estimate each decomposition and summarize results in Appendix table B1. Here we report
the average fraction attributable to a given component, across all decompositions, as well as
the standard deviation. The components are: (1) the share of ads among continuing rms,

pC
mt ;

(2) the distribution of ads across continuing rms that post in the same occupation in

both periods,

1

CO
Nof
mt
1

NfCO
mt

; (3) the within-rm-occupation skill requirement for continuing rms,
1

CO
CO 2
N CO 1
Nof
Nomt
mt Nomt
CO1
skillof
mt ; (4) the distribution of ads across occupations, which combines N CO1 , N CO2 , N N CO1 ,
mt
mt
f mt
π1c , π2c , and π1nc ; (5) the skill requirement among continuing rms posting to occupations

they had not previously posted in, which combines

CO3
skill¯mt
; and (6) the skill
1
N
CO
¯
¯ N CO2 . These
skill
and skill

2

CO
skillomt

requirement among non-continuing rms, which combines

and

omt

mt

dier from the six components listed in the main text in that (4) here combines all occupationdistribution elements, and we specically isolate the change in skill requirements driven by
continuing rms that move into and out of occupations (5).

74 For example,
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is the change in skill requirements
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between 2007 and t, attributed to just changes in the within occupation-rm-MSA skill requirements among
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continuing rms, holding constant all other components at their levels in
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(1)

0.068
(0.107)
0.088
(0.137)
0.116
(0.228)
0.173
(0.169)
0.301
(0.179)
0.244
(0.107)

(1)

0.074
(0.146)
0.048
(0.149)
-0.011
(0.319)
0.044
(0.136)
0.085
(0.169)
0.192
(0.171)

0.419
(0.082)
0.474
(0.118)
0.599
(0.300)
0.504
(0.087)
0.372
(0.059)
0.318
(0.032)

0.042
(0.042)
0.064
(0.045)
0.053
(0.123)
-0.010
(0.076)
0.009
(0.062)
-0.121
(0.042)

0.077
(0.025)
0.053
(0.038)
-0.061
(0.067)
0.088
(0.069)
0.106
(0.049)
0.198
(0.044)

0.207
(0.037)
0.147
(0.025)
0.145
(0.124)
0.004
(0.181)
0.174
(0.211)
0.138
(0.058)

0.286
(0.062)
0.269
(0.101)
-0.022
(0.174)
0.270
-0.216
0.008
(0.146)
0.150
(0.054)

0.100
(0.079)
0.131
(0.044)
0.343
(0.097)
0.167
(0.151)
0.034
(0.095)
0.065
(0.038)

0.107
(0.066)
0.097
(0.032)
0.061
(0.019)
0.119
(0.096)
0.104
(0.036)
0.128
(0.026)

Cognitive Skill Requirements
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

0.055
(0.010)
0.045
(0.008)
-0.021
(0.037)
-0.014
(0.027)
-0.024
(0.033)
-0.069
(0.025)

Education Requirements
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

0.232
(0.099)
0.268
(0.131)
0.356
(0.206)
0.267
(0.094)
0.379
(0.166)
0.276
(0.098)

(6)

0.333
(0.152)
0.317
(0.131)
0.442
(0.255)
0.388
(0.123)
0.452
(0.187)
0.481
(0.178)

(1)

-0.178
(0.185)
-0.034
(0.167)
-0.004
(0.207)
-0.035
(0.226)
0.062
(0.202)
0.091
(0.254)

(1)

-0.006
(0.126)
-0.039
(0.134)
-0.076
(0.243)
-0.018
(0.143)
0.001
(0.178)
0.060
(0.167)

0.463
(0.149)
0.475
(0.133)
0.550
(0.300)
0.513
(0.137)
0.448
(0.122)
0.426
(0.174)

0.069
(0.051)
0.112
(0.062)
0.184
(0.091)
0.147
(0.108)
0.104
(0.062)
0.007
(0.068)

0.122
(0.045)
0.138
(0.048)
0.016
(0.065)
0.100
(0.075)
0.091
(0.046)
0.203
(0.056)

0.033
(0.060)
0.089
(0.070)
0.040
((0.073)
-0.062
(0.040)
-0.049
(0.048)
-0.337
(0.087)

0.575
(0.115)
0.383
(0.109)
0.289
(0.135)
0.229
(0.058)
0.206
(0.049)
0.205
(0.142)

-0.090
(0.166)
0.085
(0.110)
0.250
(0.148)
0.217
(0.216)
0.075
(0.181)
0.004
(0.262)

0.200
(0.159)
0.136
(0.089)
0.072
(0.104)
0.179
(0.141)
0.226
(0.155)
0.460
(0.196)

Computer Skill Requirements
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

0.053
(0.098)
0.041
(0.046)
0.009
(0.107)
-0.084
(0.066)
-0.075
(0.064)
-0.153
(0.147)

Experience Requirements
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

0.459
(0.167)
0.342
(0.163)
0.353
(0.198)
0.472
(0.195)
0.480
(0.197)
0.577
(0.120)

(6)

0.298
(0.129)
0.274
(0.119)
0.318
(0.189)
0.342
(0.119)
0.431
(0.179)
0.457
(0.168)

Notes: The table gives the share of the coefficient listed in the left column attributed to a change in the component labeled in the top row, averaged across 720 decomposition orders and the
standard deviation across all orders in parentheses. Components are: (1) share of ads to continuing firm-MSAs, (2) firm distribution among continuing firms, (3) within firm-occupation-MSA
skill requirement, (4) the distribution of ads across occupations, (5) the within-occupation skill requirement among continuing firms in non-continuing occupations, (6 ) within-occupation skill
requirement among non-continuing firms.
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attributed to:
Shock*2010

Table B1: Decomposing Upskilling Within and Across Firms and Occupations

C

Alternative Explanations for Upskilling

We explore three possibilities for why rms may desire to hire more-skilled workers without
otherwise adjusting their production technology: (1) rms temporarily and opportunistically
seek higher-skilled workers in a slack labor market, (2) replacement hiring dierentially
requires more-skilled workers due to dierential recoveries in quit rates (i.e., the job ladder
needs to clear), and (3) population changes in educational attainment alter the availability
of skill.

C.1

Opportunistic Upskilling

It could be that some rms always want to hire more-skilled workers, but in a tight labor
market, they cannot attract (or aord) them. In slack economies, rms may opportunistically
seek out higher-skilled workers. Again, this eect should be temporary, while we nd that
upskilling is persistent. However, as we have noted, labor markets have been slow to make a
full recovery. To investigate this issue, we compare the upskilling eect across labor markets
where employment shocks more or less severely aected high-skilled workers. If opportunistic
upskilling take place, it should be more likely to occur in MSAs where high-skilled workers
were more severely aected, and thus more readily available to take lower-skilled positions.
We augment equation (1) with controls for the change in the unemployment rate during
the Great Recession among college graduates age 25 or older, obtained from the ACS. As
with the Bartik employment shock, we interact the college unemployment rate shock with
year dummies to allow it to aect changing skill requirements each year. We also norm this
variable so that a one unit change equals the 9010 percentile dierential across MSAs. We
plot both estimates in gure C1.
First, we note that the overall employment shock and the college unemployment rate
shock are only weakly correlated (r

=

0.14). Highly educated MSAs such as New York City

and San Jose/Santa Clara had larger increases in their college unemployment rates, while
MSAs particularly aected by the housing bubble, such as Phoenix, did not.
Holding constant the overall size of the employment shock on an MSA, we nd that
a larger increase in the college unemployment rate also generates upskilling.

In the early

years of the recovery, skill requirements see an additional modest increase that is statistically
signicant for all skill variables in 2010 and 2011. However, the impact of the college unemployment rate shock dissipates quickly for education, experience and cognitive requirements,
and has converged back to pre-recession levels by 2015.

The eect remains signicant in

2015 only for computer skill requirements. Yet, the eect of the overall employment shock,
holding constant the size of the college graduate unemployment rate shock, remains quantitatively large (and often larger than before), statistically signicant, and persistent for each
skill type except computer skills.
This set of results has two important implications.
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First, the impact of the shock to

Figure C1: Upskilling and the College Unemployment Rate
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college graduates does not persist but fades to pre-recession levels, suggesting that some
opportunistic upskilling may have occurred early in the recovery (Sasser Modestino, Shoag,
and Ballance 2016a, 2016b).

Second, and more important, the overall employment shock

induces persistent upskilling, even holding constant the size of the shock to college graduates,
implying that opportunistic upskilling does not drive our main results. The exception is for
computer skills, where it may be dicult to separately identify the overall employment shock
from the college graduate shock, since computer skill increases are likely heavily concentrated
in the most-educated MSAs.

C.2

75

Quits and Replacement Hiring

We have argued that the persistence in (rm-specic) upskilling is key to disentangling
cyclical explanations from structural ones. However, it could be that cyclical explanations
(such as the bottleneck hypothesis) account for early upskilling and that labor supply factors
drive upskilling later in the period. For example, quits were slow to recover following the
Great Recession.

If quit rates among higher-skilled workers recovered more quickly, then

some of the apparently persistent upskilling could be driven by replacement hiring higher up
on the job ladder. Dierences would eventually even out across groups as quit rates among

75 We have also examined rm-level upskilling by the initial skill requirements of the rm (instead of the
initial

change in skill requirements, as above.

If opportunistic upskilling is an important part of the story,

we would expect to see increases in skill requirements concentrated among rms with low or middling initial
levels; however, we nd no evidence in support of this hypothesis.
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Figure C2: Quit Rates by Date and Education Group
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Graph plots local polynomial smoothed quit rates. Vertical dashed lines indicate NBER
dated recessions.

lower-skilled workers recover.
However, we see no evidence of dierential recovery in quit rates across skill groups. For
instance, in gure C2 we plot smoothed time series of quit rates by education group from

76

19982015 using longitudinally-linked CPS data.

Besides the large and well-known secular

decline in quits (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2013), the gure shows the quit rate has a
clear cyclical component, declining during NBER-dated recessions (indicated with vertical
dashed lines) and recovering somewhat shortly thereafter. There is certainly no evidence in
this gure that quit rates for higher-skilled workers (lighter lines) recover more quickly or
become more pronounced later in the recovery than those for lower-skilled workers (darker
lines); in fact, less-educated workers show faster recoveries.

It thus seems unlikely that

replacement hiring is driving the persistence in upskilling.

C.3

Educational Attainment

Firms may decide to upskill if they observe that skilled workers have become more plentiful
in their local economy.

Indeed, a long line of research has explored whether educational

attainment responds to local labor market conditions. Past evidence generally nds mod-

76 We dene a quit as a worker who reported switching employers between month
was employed in both months), or one who reported being employed in month

t + 1,

t

t

and montht

+1

(but

and unemployed in month

and gave voluntary job leaving as a reason for the unemployment. To obtain quit rates we divide the

count of quits by the total number of employed workers in montht.
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erate eects on enrollment, but limited eects on attainment.

77

One exception is Charles,

Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2015), who nd that during the 2000s, the housing boom reduced
educational attainment, primarily on the two-year college margin. This eect (and any symmetric rise in attainment when the housing bubble crashed) is less relevant for our sample
of primarily higher-skilled jobs.

In particular, the housing boom was a shock principally

aecting low-skilled workers, while the Great Recession was broad-based.

78

Using American Community Survey data, we examine the relationship between labor
market conditions and changes in educational attainment across U.S. states, and nd only
modest eects. We regress state-year educational attainment on state-level Bartik employment shocks, allowing this shock to interact with year, in a manner analogous to the MSAlevel shocks used in equation (1).

We focus on a young population (aged 1832) whose

educational attainment decisions should be most malleable. Our estimates (available upon
request) imply that a state experiencing a Great-Recession-sized shock has no change in
the probability that its young population attains at least some college and a (weakly) lower
probability that it attains at least a bachelor's degree. Thus we conclude that changes in
educational attainment induced by the Great Recession are unlikely to be driving our results.

D

Supplemental Figures and Tables

77 Card and Lemieux (2001) nd that local unemployment rates have small, positive impacts on high school
attendance and completion, marginal impacts on college attendance, and no impact on college completion.
Barr and Turner (2015), using more recent data, nd that college enrollment has grown more responsive to
the business cycle over time. Kahn (2010) nds that among cohorts graduating from college between 1979
and 1989, those graduating in a worse economy obtained an additional year of graduate school, on average.
She also nds that economic conditions at time of high school graduation did not aect college completion.
Altonji, Kahn, and Speer (2016) nd similar modest eects over a broader time period.

78 For example, Altonji, Kahn and Speer (2016) show that the Great Recession aected recent college

graduates more severely than past recessions had, and that higher-earning college majors lost much of their
previous advantage in weathering worse labor market entry conditions.
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Figure D1: Impact of MSA-Specic Employment Shock on Education Requirements
(a) Education Requirements
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Graphs plot coefficients on MSA employment shock interacted with year, and 90% CI's (dashed lines).
Regressions also control for year fixed effects and MSA characteristics.

(b) Experience Requirements
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Graphs plot coefficients on MSA employment shock interacted with year, and 90% CI's (dashed lines).
Regressions also control for year fixed effects and MSA characteristics.
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Figure D2: Upskilling by Sector Tradability, based on Jensen-Kleitzer Oshorability

Experience Requirement
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Blue line = local products, Maroon dashed line = traded products
Bartik shock*year effects interacted with offshorability, fitted for 90th and 10th percentiles.
Regressions also control for sector and year fixed effects and MSA characteristics.
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2014

2015
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0.0543***
(0.0134)
0.0477***
(0.0129)
0.0218*
(0.0130)
0.0365***
(0.0117)
0.0385***
(0.0145)
0.0413***
(0.0141)
2,286
0.209
X

(5)

(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
Experience Requirements

(5)

0.0462*** 0.0454*** 0.0528*** 0.0518*** 0.0505*** 0.0430*** 0.0457*** 0.0494*** 0.0489***
(0.0150) (0.0133) (0.0137) (0.0129) (0.0136) (0.0157) (0.0147) (0.0135) (0.0130)
0.0416*** 0.0382*** 0.0478*** 0.0466*** 0.0461*** 0.0403*** 0.0361*** 0.0445*** 0.0437***
(0.0137) (0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0126) (0.0131) (0.0139) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0133)
0.0194
0.0202
0.0241*
0.0234* 0.0268** 0.0242*
0.0204
0.0260*
0.0250*
(0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0124) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0134)
0.0376*** 0.0332*** 0.0403*** 0.0408*** 0.0359*** 0.0369*** 0.0311** 0.0364*** 0.0358***
(0.0118) (0.0127) (0.0121) (0.0114) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0131) (0.0122) (0.0121)
0.0392*** 0.0304** 0.0430*** 0.0441*** 0.0411*** 0.0417*** 0.0301** 0.0435*** 0.0434***
(0.0147) (0.0153) (0.0144) (0.0137) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0149) (0.0140) (0.0137)
0.0436*** 0.0298** 0.0488*** 0.0532*** 0.0426*** 0.0448*** 0.0313** 0.0465*** 0.0478***
(0.0140) (0.0150) (0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0138) (0.0158) (0.0141) (0.0139)
2,286
2,286
192,842
192,842
2,286
2,286
2,286
192,842 192,842
0.216
0.247
0.045
0.375
0.292
0.299
0.306
0.069
0.354
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

(2)
(3)
(4)
Education Requirements

Notes: Regressions are estimated at the msa-year level (columns 1-3) or msa-occupation (4-digit SOC) year level (columns 4-5). The dependent variable is the MSA (1-3) or MSAoccupation (4-5) level annual change in skill requirements from 2007. All regressions control for year fixed effects and MSA characteristics from the ACS. Unemployment controls
(column 2) include the annual change (from 2007) in the MSA overall and college-specific unemployment rates. Column 3 includes ads with no firm listed. Column 5 additionally
includes occupation fixed effects and occupation-specific time trends. Observations are weighted by the size of the MSA labor force in 2006 (multiplied by the occupation's ad share
in the MSA-year in columns 4-5). Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. Shock is the change in projected year-over-year employment growth in the MSA from 2006 to
2009, divided by the 90-10 differential in the variable across all MSAs.

# Cells
R-Squared
MSA-Level
Unemployment Controls
Includes missing firms
Occupation-MSA Level
Occ FE and time trend
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Shock*2015

Bartiik*2014

Shock*2013

Shock*2012

Shock*2011

Shock*2010

(1)

Table D1a: Education and Experience Robustness Checks
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0.0201***
(0.00688)
0.0210***
(0.00640)
0.0128**
(0.00638)
0.0128**
(0.00562)
0.0142**
(0.00576)
0.0213***
(0.00675)
2,286
0.351
X

0.0202***
(0.00704)
0.0208***
(0.00665)
0.0120*
(0.00636)
0.0128**
(0.00564)
0.0139**
(0.00575)
0.0213***
(0.00656)
2,286
0.354
X
X
X

0.0143**
(0.00718)
0.0165**
(0.00682)
0.00866
(0.00602)
0.00921
(0.00633)
0.0106*
(0.00616)
0.0204**
(0.00857)
2,286
0.427
X

X

0.0207***
(0.00631)
0.0207***
(0.00631)
0.0136**
(0.00628)
0.0137**
(0.00542)
0.0150***
(0.00542)
0.0230***
(0.00697)
177,971
0.044

(2)
(3)
(4)
Cognitive Requirements

(5)

X
X

0.0207***
(0.00567)
0.0206***
(0.00578)
0.0140**
(0.00576)
0.0143***
(0.00493)
0.0160***
(0.00498)
0.0252***
(0.00664)
177,971
0.314

Notes: See panel A. Observations additionally restricted to ads with any specific skill requirements.

# Cells
R-Squared
MSA-Level
Unemployment Controls
Includes missing firms
Occupation-MSA Level
Occ FE and time trend
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Shock*2015

Bartiik*2014

Shock*2013

Shock*2012

Shock*2011

Shock*2010

(1)
0.0168
(0.0137)
0.0261***
(0.00816)
0.0265**
(0.0109)
0.0277***
(0.00789)
0.0229***
(0.00786)
0.0130
(0.00817)
2,286
0.318
X

(1)
0.0122
(0.0133)
0.0227***
(0.00865)
0.0253**
(0.0112)
0.0283***
(0.00814)
0.0234***
(0.00790)
0.0142*
(0.00852)
2,286
0.323
X
X
X

0.0161
(0.0112)
0.0263***
(0.00907)
0.0261**
(0.0102)
0.0271***
(0.00815)
0.0199**
(0.00878)
0.0131
(0.00831)
2,286
0.333
X

X

0.0203**
(0.00862)
0.0241***
(0.00718)
0.0207**
(0.00851)
0.0250***
(0.00664)
0.0225***
(0.00675)
0.0131
(0.00800)
177,971
0.034

(2)
(3)
(4)
Computer Requirements

Table D1b: Cognitive and Computer Skill Robustness Checks

X
X

0.0212***
(0.00744)
0.0239***
(0.00648)
0.0205***
(0.00767)
0.0248***
(0.00596)
0.0232***
(0.00608)
0.0152**
(0.00769)
177,971
0.291

(5)

Table D2: Probability of Being Missing from a Subsample

(1)

(2)
(3)
Change in Pr(Missing from):
2007-10 Change Sample Compustat Sample
Firm Sample
Shock*2010
Shock*2011
Shock*2012
Shock*2013
Bartiik*2014
Shock*2015
# MSA-year Cells
R2
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.0273
(0.0178)
-0.0299
(0.0184)
-0.0656***
(0.0195)
-0.0155
(0.0202)
0.00305
(0.0269)
0.0269
(0.0224)
2,286

-0.0217*
(0.0125)
-0.0119
(0.0118)
-0.0151
(0.0118)
0.00369
(0.0115)
0.0146
(0.0123)
0.000999
(0.0124)
2,286

0.0128
(0.0144)
0.0239*
(0.0139)
0.0333**
(0.0159)
0.00888
(0.0107)
0.0105
(0.0124)
-0.00101
(0.0128)
2,286

0.265

0.241

0.594

Notes: Observations are MSA-year cells weighted by the MSA labor force in 2006. Dependent variables are the change from 2007 in
the share of ads missing from the sample of non-missing firms (column 1), the sample of firms that post at least 5 ads in 2007 and
2010 conditional on being in the non-missing firm sample (column 2), and the Compustat sample, conditional on being in the 2007-10
change sample (column 3). Regressions also include year fixed effects and MSA characteristics obtained from the ACS. Standard
errors are clustered at the MSA level.
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